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One of the problems left in Kantian moral theory is the Kantian sex problem; how can one justify
any act of sex, when sex requires the treatment of another person as merely a means to an end? 
The treatment that Kant's problem describes is now known as sexual objectification, and it has 
become a major concern for feminist theory. My thesis begins by examining the Kantian sex 
problem and its context within Kant's moral theory. I then employ a typology from the work of 
Alan Soble in order to typify and better explore Kant's own response and the responses of four 
feminist theorists. I then examine the theories of sexual objectification offered by Andrea 
Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Nussbaum, and Rae Langton. After explaining and 
critiquing each of these theories, I offer my own theory of how to solve the Kantian sex problem 
by synthesizing the major advancements of each of the radical feminist approaches to sexual 
objectification. My thesis concludes with a novel theory that responds to the Kantian sex 
problem by judging the context of the treatment and the attitudes held by those treating another 
person as a sexual object. The three criteria for this judgment of the morality of any act of sexual 
objectification are respect, recognition, and reciprocation.
Introduction
One of the many issues in feminist moral thought is sexual objectification. This term has 
roots located in Aristotle's conception of the natural slave in The Politics, but is most known for 
its presence in Immanuel Kant's moral theories. The primary issue in sexual objectification, as it 
develops in feminist writing, comes from Kant's belief that people should not be treated merely 
as objects, but as subjects. The central concern of his theory is how people can be treated so as to
recognize their humanity fully in every action. Kant distinguishes sexual objectification from the 
general immoral act of objectifying by claiming that sexual pleasure robs people of the ability to 
treat one another as fully human and not merely as an object of pleasure. This claim started what 
would essentially become a line of thought that could be called Kantian feminism which focuses 
on the matter of sexual objectification as central to issues of morality.
Each proposed answer to the Kantian problem of sexual objectification has lacked 
completeness in its address to the problem. This difficulty occurs as a matter of consistently 
narrow interpretations of the causes and solutions to Kant's interpretation of sexuality or 
objectification, which are themselves applied confusedly from his moral law1. This thesis 
concerns itself with the creation of a more complete theory which will not suffer from the 
narrowness found in previous applications of Kant's moral law. This requires a review of the 
most compelling arguments assembled by the Kantian feminists, a compilation of the most 
valuable pieces of these arguments, and a synthesis of these ideas with a new theory that will 
more fully answer the Kantian problem. 
1 The problem is that Kant's practical philosophy seems to be counter-intuitive or contradictory to his metaphysics
of morals. This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
2The primary argument this thesis makes is that sexual objectification is not always 
morally wrong. It must instead be seen as a complex situation in which the attitudinal and 
psychological features of the sexual actors are considered within the context of the relationship, 
personal histories, and culture in which the act is occurring so that a subtle case by case analysis 
would be needed to provide a nuanced evaluation of each particular case of sexual 
objectification. The consequence of a such a theory is that it would consider both external and 
internal factors to moral actions within a Kantian moral framework and give a level of 
adaptability to sexual objectification that would allow it to be wrong in cases like rape, 
molestation, and malevolent relationships- i.e. those relationships where the man dominates the 
woman by using her merely as his own object- while still being morally acceptable as part of 
healthy romantic relationships or in cases of mutually respectful casual sex. This new theory will
maintain the universality of Kant's categorical imperative, but be sensitive and adaptive to 
individual cases and their various morally relevant influences.  
The first chapter of this thesis will concern itself primarily with Kant's argument as it is 
conceived in his various writings on ethics and submit a typology by which to organize responses
to his theory of sexual objectification. It will provide a thorough analysis of Kant's moral theory 
and provide a basis by which to understand each feminist theory in terms of the Kantian ethical 
framework. It will then examine Kant's own proposed solution to the sex problem and respond 
with a meaningful criticism of his response.  The chapter will then end with a typology that will 
primarily make use of Alan Soble's understanding of responses to Kant's theory of sexual 
objectification. Soble's division between internal and external responses is particularly useful for 
identifying the problem of narrowness within the feminist scholarship. It allows for the solutions 
3to the Kantian sex problem to be understood in terms of their narrowness or broadness of focus. 
The internal and external factors are not necessarily exclusive of each other, but instead identify 
the main component of each proposed solution.  This chapter will lay out the groundwork for the 
rest of the paper by providing the ethical framework within which each conception must work to 
still be considered Kantian. 
The second chapter focuses on the externalist radical feminist writers Andrea Dworkin 
and Catharine MacKinnon. In this section, Dworkin and MacKinnon's arguments about the 
relationship between cultural external factors like gender hierarchy and personal attitudes, 
actions, and morality are discussed. In particular, this section identifies the primary argument that
Dworkin and MacKinnon make as one that claims that the culture in which a sexual act occurs 
fundamentally determines the nature of the act itself and the actors. Resistance to this cultural 
force seems possible, but unlikely. This argument is important because the cultural atmosphere of
gender hierarchy does seem to be an important factor in considering sexual objectification. 
However, this argument also seems to discount personal freedom and the context of the 
relationship over the context of the cultural hegemony. Dworkin and MacKinnon place so much 
emphasis on superstructure that they fail to recognize the autonomy of the agents affected by 
those structures. This leads to a theory that is incapable of accounting for personal freedom and 
therefore personal responsibility.  
The penultimate chapter reviews Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton's criticisms of 
Dworkin and MacKinnon, while also examining Nussbaum's externalist argument and Langton's 
internalist argument. Nussbaum's defining of objectification is an idea of central importance in 
any study of feminist scholarship. The definition of the term is multifaceted as people objectify 
4one another in a variety of ways and sometimes numerous different ways simultaneously. The 
relationship between the actors functions as the context in which these acts of objectification 
occur and seems to be what grants the act its moral value (good, bad, or neutral). Sexual 
objectification, for Nussbaum, occurs whenever a person is treated in a sexual fashion. The 
objectification, however, only becomes harmful when the context of this sexual treatment does 
not simultaneously recognize the sexualized person as both an end in herself and an object of, or 
means to, sexual desire. Only in meaningful relationships (romantic, friendships, or other 
mutually respectful relations) can sexuality move past mere use and into the realm of morally 
permissible or desirable. The importance of Nussbaum's position for the final theory is the value 
of personal context in shaping the moral value of an action.   
Langton praises Nussbaum's efforts, but seems to suggest that a more complete theory of 
sexual objectification has to consider how attitudes affect actions. This claim is deeply ingrained 
in western philosophy as the difference between choice an d accident (legally one could make a 
parallel in the distinction the court makes between murder and manslaughter). Langton both 
wishes to expand the number of ways in which one can be objectified in a moral manner and 
highlight the importance of attitudes in defining the morality of actions. The addition of attitudes 
and psychological states to the consideration of the moral valuation of acts of sexual 
objectification is an important addition that brings back the deontological2 concept of personal 
responsibility that is found within Kant's work. The consideration of personal responsibility 
seems to have been left out at the inclusion of contextual external factors. However, its inclusion 
is important in creating a broad and nuanced theory of sexual objectification.
The final chapter of the paper is the presentation of a new theory of sexual objectification.
2 Deontological ethical theories concern themselves with the concept of rights and corollary duties. 
5This theory will account for gender hierarchy, relationships, personal psychology and history, 
and attitude in its analysis of individual acts of sexual objectification. It will do so by 
synthesizing both the internalist and externalist theories that have been analyzed and reject the 
portions that seem to limit or constrain the ability of actors to defy a sort of moral predestination.
This consideration of both internal and external factors will not only make this theory more 
complete, but more directly align it with Kant's own original framework. It will analyze the parts
of Kant's framework in terms of the important pieces captured by other feminist theorists, while 
rejecting Kant's analysis of human nature. The central aspect of this theory is that the bodies of 
the actors in moral situations do not rob them of reason, but account for the full range of human 
experience. Sexuality is an important part of that bodily existence and must be incorporated into 
any meaningful theory of morality. The ability to reason allows humans to fully appreciate the 
humanity of another person even as they engage in acts to satisfy sexual desires. The morality of 
sexual objectification then depends on the treatment of all persons within the sexual context 
always as a subject even when objectifying them. The only time objectification ranges from 
morally problematic to evil is at those moments when one loses the rational treatment and 
realization of any person's humanity. This means that if Kant is wrong about human nature, then 
the distinction between being treated as an object and merely an object lies in the internal and 
external factors that have been identified by various theorists. A fully Kantian and nuanced 
approach to sexual objectification can then be made which will allow for the inclusion of 
sexuality in a moral life of human flourishing. This new theory would save Kant's moral 
philosophy from the convolutions and complexities that currently make it incapable of 
responding to the problem of sexual objectification and it would allow for feminist scholars to 
6better understand what causes undesirable moments of objectification in which a person is 
treated only as an object. It would also allow for a personal level of resistance to social forces 
and place responsibility more squarely on the shoulders of individual actors rather than simply 
unfortunate systems and social constructions. 
7Kant and the Kantian Typology 
Immanuel Kant's moral theory is composed of a metaphysics3 of morals and a practical 
philosophy. The metaphysics of Kant's theory considers the type of creature which has moral 
agency and how this type of creature is related to morality itself. Kant's practical philosophy is 
the application of these a priori4 understandings to create particular moral judgments. This thesis
will suggest that a theory is Kantian based solely on its acceptance of Kant's metaphysics of 
morals. The reason for this division is that Kant's metaphysics outlines the fundamental nature of
moral judgment and must be accepted to be working within the same theoretical framework as 
Kant himself, whereas his practical philosophy can be rejected as a flawed application of a priori
principles. Based on this understanding, this chapter will review the two primary components of 
Kant's metaphysics of morals (moral agency5 and its connection to moral law6) and his 
application of this theory to the concepts of sexuality, love, and friendship. 
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals
A moral agent for Kant must possess the three qualities of rational faculties, 
freedom, and a good will.  Each of these qualities is necessary for moral agency, but none of 
them alone are sufficient. A moral agent must have rationality to be morally relevant (at least for 
Kant) and to understand the moral law. This must be accompanied by freedom so that the rational
agent can be held accountable for his actions and be capable of acting in accordance with 
rationality. A free and rational agent must also be in possession of a good will7 so that his actions 
3 A “metaphysics of morals” is a claim about the nature of morality itself as opposed to a “practical philosophy,” 
which is a judgment of the moral value of a particular behavior.
4 A priori refers to knowledge or justification that is derived from reason alone (as opposed to a posteriori 
knowledge or justification that is based on experience or observation). 
5 A creature has moral agency if and only if it is capable of understanding moral reasoning and acting freely.
6 A moral law is a categorical demand that must be met in order for one to be acting in a moral manner (a law de 
facto vs a law de jure).
7 It should also be noted that a good will requires rationality because it is a reaction to rational principles. One 
8are done as the result of his desire to act upon reason rather than some other intention outside of 
moral duty. In this way, each of these characteristics function to create the whole of moral 
agency.  
In The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims, “The principles [of 
morality] should not be made to depend on the particular nature of human reason...but, rather, the
principles should be derived from the universal concept of a rational being in general, since 
moral laws should hold for every rational being as such.”i In this statement, Kant indicates that 
all moral laws are derived from the concept of a rational being. Moral agency, as it has been 
described, is the embodiment of Kant's rational being. A fully rational being must have access to 
its rational faculties, the freedom to act on those faculties, and the inclination to do so. If 
morality is to be derived and based around these agents then it indicates two things. The first is 
that only rational agents can be treated morally or immorally, and the second is that the moral 
treatment of these rational agents is the basis for all morality. Kant's metaphysical moral 
framework, the categorical imperative (CI), is organized around his understanding of moral 
agency a la rational agency. It is for this reason, that the CI is interconnected to the tripartite 
characteristics of moral agency and each of these is necessarily represented in the formulation of 
the moral law.
Rationality functions within the agent as the means by which the agent can comprehend 
the moral law. As Kant puts it, “They [moral concepts] cannot be abstracted from any empirical, 
and hence merely contingent, cognition. In this purity of their origin lies their very worthiness to 
serve us as supreme practical principles; and to the extent that something empirical is added to 
them, just so much is taken away from their genuine influence and from the absolute worth of the
cannot have a truly good will unless one also possesses reason. 
9corresponding actions.”ii This means that the moral law cannot be known from any sort of 
induction from particular experiences of morality, but instead must be understood a priori via 
reason alone. It is because of this, that rationality also functions as the basis for an agent's claim 
to the right of moral treatment per the moral law. Rationality, thus makes each agent responsible 
for his actions against each other agent. In order for these actions to occur in any meaningful way
the agent must be autonomous.8
The freedom of the agent to make choices must be presupposed by Kant's moral system.9 
He claims, “The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; 
freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any 
determination by alien causes.”iii  The will, the ability of a being to act on its desires, of a being 
towards moral action requires not only an understanding of what is to be desirable (reason), but 
the ability of that being to freely act upon that desire. Moral laws are meaningless if those that 
comprehend the laws are incapable of acting in accordance with them, or if they are incapable of 
choosing to do otherwise. In both cases, it is impossible to act out of a duty to the law and 
instead one become merely an automaton reacting to stimuli. This robs the agent of their ability 
to act in a morally considerable manner or be held responsible for their actions. The freedom that
is presupposed of moral agents is necessary for the moral law to even be possible. Free choice of 
the will and rationality are both required for a moral agent to have the esteemed faculty of a good
will. 
A good will for Kant is, “...good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor 
because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is 
8 Autonomy in this sense means free to make ones own choices.
9 The dynamic antinomy of free will, which is the basis for the assumption, is discussed in Kant's The Critique of 
Pure Reason.
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good in itself.”iv A good will is, therefore, good because it desires through rationality and by way 
of freedom to act in accordance to the moral law. In order for an act to be considered morally 
good, it not only adheres to Kant's CI, but must also do so out of a desire to do good and not 
merely incidentally or indirectly adhere to the moral law. It is because of this emphasis on the 
good will that the internal mental states of agents are important in Kant's moral philosophy. The 
act of one agent on another is good not only because of the type of action occurring, but because 
it is occurring with the actor having the correct intentions and psychological states. 
After now having considered the nature of moral agency and its connection to the moral 
law, the next thing to consider is the moral law itself. The moral law is presented by Kant in the 
form of the CI. The CI is differentiated from other imperatives by Kant when he says, “Now all 
imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical 
necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may 
possibly want). The categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as 
objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.”v A hypothetical imperative is 
one which is not necessary but based only on desire or practical concerns, whereas the CI is a 
necessary action for any rational being, with a good will, because it is fully rational itself. In 
explaining how moral agency conforms to the moral law Kant says, “...if the action is 
represented as good in itself, and hence as necessary in a will which of itself conforms to reason 
as the principle of the will, then the imperative is categorical.”vi The CI is presented in three 
forms in The Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals and each form is designed to capture the 
rational sentiment of morality that Kant espouses throughout his various writings.
The first formulation of the categorical imperative is, “I should never act except in such a 
11
way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”vii Another way of putting
this maxim is, “I should act only in a way so that if all others acted likewise I could will myself 
into that reality.” A simple application of this principle can be understood with more obvious 
moral slights like theft or murder. In the case of theft or murder, it is impossible for a moral agent
to justify his own theft or murder of another because one could not rationally desire to be in a 
world where all moral agents stole from or murdered one another. What Kant is indicating in this
formulation is that morality is just the alignment of freely chosen actions with rational 
conceptions of the world and other moral agents. The act of theft is wrong not because it offends 
the gods or leads to punishment, but because the world cannot survive with this as a moral 
imperative. The act is rejected not because of what its consequence to others is, but because Kant
expects that rational agents must act so that all agents could act in the same way and have a 
meaningful10 survival. The second formulation of the categorical imperative outlines the 
distinction between subjects (moral agents) and objects and concerns itself more directly with 
treatment and less with the concept of crating the moral law. In this way the second formulation 
is often considered the most practical of the three formulations Kant offers in The Grounding of 
the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Kant's second formulation states, “...Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether 
in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never 
simply as a means.”viii This is one the most compact statements in Kant's metaphysics of morals 
and it is pertinent to analyze each of its components in order to come to a coherent understanding
of this formulation. 
10 It is important to differentiate survival from meaningful survival. The world can survive sometime if theft is 
considered to be morally acceptable, however, it would not be a survival that recognized the rationality in each 
moral agent and therefore that survival would be ultimately meaningless. 
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The word 'act' is used here to indicate that one can only have moral judgments about the 
actions one actually takes. Kant does not allow us to judge the morality of someone's desire to do
something immoral if the action is never taken. The desire to harm would then be separated from
the act of harming. This does not dismiss internal states from Kant's moral theory, however, it 
does mean these states can only be judged as morally relevant in relation to an action taken by 
the moral agent and not as a stand-alone point of judgment. These actions are to be done, if 
moral, in such a way that they treat the humanity of the person being acted upon in a particular 
way. 
'Humanity' is normally used to refer to the essential features of the human condition that 
are shared by humans insofar as they are a class11. The concept of humanity for Kant is not 
related to the basic biological makeup of the species homo sapien, but is instead closely linked to
his use of the word 'person' in this same sentence. The trait which defines humanity that one must
have in order to be a person is reason. If one does not have the ability to exercise reason through 
some rational faculty then one is not a member of humanity nor capable of being a person. If 
there were some fully rational extraterrestrial intelligence then it would be considered a member 
of humanity, a moral agent, and a person. However, if there were a human who were incapable of
rational thought because of age, development, or any other type of occurrence then such a human
would not be part of the class of humanity. 
Kant ends this statement by claiming that if one is to consider an action moral then that 
action must treat all rational agents as ends in themselves and never simply as a means. The act 
11 Class here is referring to a particular set- in this case humans- that are defined by particular necessary and 
sufficient conditions or a family resemblance. Kant works under the assumption that the class of humans share a
particular set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and as a consequence of this belief he will dismiss children 
and the mentally ill as being incapable of having full humanity. This is because they lack the rationality that 
Kant finds to be the main component of humanity. 
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of treating someone as simply a means is called objectification. By denying someone the respect 
of their rational agency, one actively denies that such a person is an autonomous subject and 
instead reduces that person to the state of an object via that treatment. This means that the 
treatment of a particular person or thing as simply a means is to treat that person or thing as an 
object. Conversely, the treatment of a particular person or thing as an end in itself is to treat that 
person or thing as a subject. The treatment of someone or something as simply a means indicates 
that one places value on that someone or something solely on its use to getting to some end12. 
The treatment of someone or something as an end in itself, is the treatment of that someone or 
something as though it has an intrinsic value. This means that subjects, ends in themselves, are 
valuable as they are, but the treatment of them as though they are not- as if they are simply 
objects- is immoral because it violates the immutable intrinsic value of the subject. However, it is
possible to treat someone as a means to an end and simultaneously as an end in oneself. This is 
not morally problematic because the subject retains its proper respect throughout its treatment. 
This can be exemplified in the relationship that exists between student and teacher. The teacher 
uses the students as a means of getting paid but gives the students an education out of respect for 
their desires and because honoring the agreement admits to the right the student has to that 
particular gain. The student, likewise, uses the teacher to gain an education but pays the teacher 
so as to honor the exchange of the work from the teacher and fully recognize the efforts of the 
teacher as a person deserving a particular level of respect. The element of objectification is not 
morally reprehensible because it does not deny the humanity or subject nature of the person 
being treated as an object. The alternative would be something like the treatment of a rape victim
12 This is only problematic when it is the treatment of a rational agent as simply a means. In other permutations 
(i.e. treating an object as merely a means, treating a non-rational being as merely a means, or either of these as 
ends in themselves) there is no moral problem from the perspective of Kant's moral framework. 
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by the rapist. The rapist treats his target as simply a means to power, pleasure, and/or sexual 
achievement but doesn't care for the desire or autonomy of his target. The rape victim has no 
exchange with his rapist, but is instead made into merely the object of the rapist's desires. The 
difference between these two actions at the fundamental level is the presence or lack of 
reciprocation, respect, and recognition which are the components of treating one as an end in 
oneself.13 
The idea of respecting other moral agents as ends in themselves is most directly 
addressed in Kant's third formulation of the CI. The analysis doesn't account for how one 
actually correctly respects another person as an end in himself, but it does offer a way to consider
others as ends in themselves from a moral perspective. Kant's third formulation states: 
For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all 
others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby 
arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a 
kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends...A rational being belongs to the kingdom 
of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself 
subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign, when as legislator he is himself 
subject to the will of no other.ix 
This formulation is complex in its application because once a moral agent acts as a 
member of a kingdom of ends then he is a member. This formulation states, that by acting 
according to reason rational beings become members of a kingdom of ends. A kingdom of ends 
is an idealized world in which all rational beings act in full accord with rational principles. This 
is a vision of a utopian world in which rational beings recognize their full potential. This world 
can only be achieved by rational agents choosing to be members of this kingdom of ends before 
13 The idea of reciprocation, respect, and recognition will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis and are not
Kant's ideas of treating someone as an end in himself. Kant's idea of treatment is never fully explained in his 
metaphysics of morals, but its application to particular cases in his practical philosophy can be explored in The 
Metaphysics of Morals (especially the second book) and Lectures on Ethics.  
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it obtains14 in reality. In a kingdom of ends every rational agent would be sovereign unto himself 
because all rational agents would, according to Kant, legislate the same laws for all members and
would therefore act simultaneously as their own legislator and sovereign. The ideal of the 
kingdom of ends is at once a version of the CI and also the suggested outcome of the CI's 
implementation as a practice rather than only a rational principle15. 
Each of Kant's three formulations provide a means by which one can identify the 
particular things one should restrain oneself from doing. Kant's CI is designed to be the basis for 
all particular moral principles. It is the underlying framework by which moral imperatives must 
be constructed, and with which no maxim can contradict. Kant synthesizes the three formulations
as a model for the construction of moral maxims when he says:
All maxims have, namely, 1. A form, which consists in universality; and in this respect 
the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: maxims must be so chosen as if 
they were to hold universal laws of nature. 2. A matter, viz., an end; and here the formula 
says that a rational being, inasmuch as he is by his very nature an end and hence an end in
himself, must serve in every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and 
arbitrary ends. 3. A complete determination of all maxims by the formula that all maxims 
proceeding from his own legislation ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends 
as a kingdom of nature.x
  
  The three formulations are combined to provide a single coherent framework. Any 
maxim must be willed to be universal in its treatment of all rational beings as ends in themselves 
and never merely as a means. This maxim must be capable of harmonizing with all other maxims
which compose a possible kingdom of ends. This is the product of Kant's metaphysics of morals. 
It is the law which binds rational beings as he defines them. It is used as a basis to judge the 
moral value of every perceivable moral law. It forces these laws to work in concert to become a 
14 Something obtains when it becomes a part of the world rather than existing solely as an object of imagination or 
thought. 
15 It is important to note that Kant thinks people should act in accordance to the CI even if a kingdom of ends 
never arises because morality is based on actions and not consequences. 
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coherent morality in which no law can contradict another (per the 3rd formulation). If a moral law
conforms to the CI then and only then do moral agents have a duty to that law. All moral agents 
have a duty to act on these rational moral principles and act according to this duty only through a
good will. 
The final element of Kant's metaphysics of morals is the concept of duty which binds the 
moral agent to the moral law. A distinction between duty (the necessary link between the agent 
and the law) and a good will (the desire to act on duty) should be kept in mind when considering 
Kant's contemplation of the role of duty in morality. One does not have a duty because one wills 
to act morally, rather one wills to act morally only because one has a duty. Kant claims that our 
duty to the moral law is derived from the CI. The CI is based upon and reflects the rationality of 
moral agents, and because of this if there is a duty to anything then it is to the moral law defined 
by the CI. As Kant puts it, “...if duty is a concept which is to have significance and real 
legislative authority for our actions, then such duty can be expressed only in categorical 
imperatives.”xi Kant goes on to explain, “For duty has to be practical, unconditioned necessity of 
action; hence it must hold for all rational beings (to whom alone an imperative is at all 
applicable) and for this reason only can it also be a law for all human wills.”xii It is in this 
passage that Kant defines duty as, “unconditioned necessity of action.” This means that anytime 
one has a duty within Kant's deontological ethical system, then they must act according to a 
particular principle unconditionally in order to be acting in accordance with the moral law. The 
concept of necessary action is the defining characteristic of deontological theories. The concept 
of duty and its relationship to the moral agent and the CI are the defining features of Kant's 
moral framework. 
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Before proceeding to Kant's practical philosophy, it seems pertinent to differentiate 
between the CI and a CI. 'The CI' is the most basic fundamental moral law and the moral law 
upon which all others are built. However, 'a CI' is one of any number of moral laws that can fit 
into the framework of the CI. The totality of the moral law is composed of various categorical 
imperatives because each law must be categorical in its scope (being necessary to all rational 
beings) and an imperative in terms of duty (requiring an unconditioned necessity of action). The 
practical philosophy of Kant and any Kantian is up for debate because they are arguing the moral
law they propose is based on the CI, but these individual moral laws can be dismissed and one 
can still maintain a Kantian metaphysics of morals. With this distinction in mind, one can 
consider Kant's myriad of suggested moral laws and offer a meaningful critique of them from 
Kant's own theory. The next section is an analysis and critique of Kant's practical philosophy as 
it is connected to the concept of sex, love, and friendship.
Kant's Practical Philosophy
Kant's opinions on sex are shaped by his environment and carry the baggage of 
enlightenment era culture and Christianity. Much of his hostility towards sexual relations is 
captured in his statement, “In loving from sexual inclination, they make the person into an object
of their appetite. As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetite sated, they are thrown 
away, as one throws away a lemon after sucking the juice from it.”xiii Kant believes that sex is an 
entirely carnal act and any attempt to include affection into the act itself is futile. The satiation of
one's appetite for another leaves the object of these desires used and unwanted once the passions 
subside. Kant doesn't discount the attempts that people make to incorporate sex and affection but,
thinks these attempts ultimately fail without the contract of marriage. 
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Kant claims, “The sexual impulse can admittedly be combined with human affection, and
then it also carries with it the aims of the latter, but if it is taken in and by itself, it is nothing 
more than appetite. But, so considered, there lies in this inclination a degradation of man; for as 
soon as anyone becomes an object of another's appetite, that person is in fact a thing, whereby 
the other's appetite is sated, and can be misused as such a thing by anybody.”xiv In this statement, 
and many others, Kant implies that sex is an act in which a person takes another's body as an 
inert thing for his use. His interpretation of sex as a parasitic act is the basis for his rejection of 
the act as necessarily immoral. Kant's claim can be understood as a conditional that states: if 
non-marital sex is necessarily parasitic then it violates the second formulation of the CI. This 
occurs because the treatment of the person as only a means to sexual pleasure reduces that person
to the state of an object of appetite. The object of the sexual desire is then treated merely as the 
means to the pleasure of the moral agent using him and never as an end in himself because he is 
only recognized to the degree that he offers sexual pleasure to said agent. This limited scope of 
recognition denies the subject nature of the sexual object. The failure to recognize another as an 
end in himself occurs when one fails to act upon the idea that, “For the ends of any subject who 
is an end in himself must as far as possible be my ends also, if that conception of an end in itself 
is to have its full effect in me.”xv The failure of the moral agent partaking of sexual pleasure is 
the inability of that agent to view the desires of the partner beyond his own sexual appetite. This 
means that the moral agent fails to respect the ends of the object of the sexual desire. Kant's 
claim about sexuality is that the appetite overwhelms moral agents and robs them of the ability to
fully recognize the humanity of the sexual object who becomes simply a means. 
The rejection of Kant's position on sexuality requires a rejection of his claim that, “...the 
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sexual impulse is not an inclination that one human has for another, qua human, but an 
inclination for their sex, it is therefore a principium of the debasement of humanity, a source for 
the preference of one sex over the other, and the dishonoring of that sex by satisfying the 
inclination.”xvi The claims that Kant has made about the nature of sex are all biased at some level 
by his personal experiences. There seems to be no quality of sex that robs its actors of the ability 
to recognize the humanity of their respective partners. Kant insists that all sex is overwhelming 
of reason, but it seems that this is merely a possibility. There are many cases of unmarried 
couples having sex so that they share the spaces of their bodies and act to recognize the desires 
of their significant other in the act of sex. Sex in these cases is not simply an appetite for the 
sexual organs and pleasure, but instead an act of intimacy that helps two people share the whole 
of their person in an act that requires mutual respect and in a basic sense love16. This type of 
sexual treatment is exemplified by Eric and Donna's relationship in That 70's Show.17 Throughout
the first two seasons of the show Eric and Donna are shown to have strong sexual desires for one
another. These desires lead to a form of sexual objectification in which both people see the other 
as a means to sexual satisfaction. However, unlike Kant's theory, Eric and Donna first restrain 
their sexual desire as part of their recognition of each other's humanity. Their first sexual act 
comes after many years of knowing each other, and after dating for over a year. Their first act of 
sex is preceded by Donna writing wedding vows for her parents in which she voiced her love for 
Eric. This declaration of love leads to the two characters having pre-marital sex.xvii The sex is not 
a mere satisfaction of the couple’s mutual desires, it is an act that expresses the love and intimacy
the two share. The context of the relationship, the intentions of the two actors in the situation, 
16 This love would be well-wishing or benevolence for Kant or perhaps more generally the Platonic concept of 
Eros. 
17 A more complete analysis of That 70's Show is available in the final chapter. 
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and their resulting attitudes towards each other successfully allow them to sexually objectify 
each other while still recognizing, respecting, and reciprocating their personhood. 
Sex is not necessarily an act of intimacy or love. The point of depicting an alternative 
possibility for sex is to show that there is no reason why sex would necessarily be in violation of 
the second formulation of the CI. The rejection of Kant's universal claim would require only one 
example in an inductive18 sense, or in a deductive19 sense one must merely prove that there is no 
reason why sex is necessarily what Kant has claimed it to be. In addition to these particular 
claims about sex, Kant also makes similar arguments about friendship and love as they relate 
back to sex. He believes that sex destroys friendship and love by violating moral principles and 
can only occur in a morally permissible way in the case of marriage. 
In relation to friendship Kant claims, “Friendship is an Idea, because it is not drawn from 
experience, but has its seat in the understanding; in experience it is very defective, but in morals 
it is a very necessary Idea.”xviii He claims that friendship is necessarily defective in any 
incarnation that can be experienced a posteriori, however, despite its failures to be adequately 
practiced, friendship is considered to be a virtue and worthy of human effort. The meaningful 
relationships that exist between rational agents, when they are noble and moral, are imperfect 
versions of a single a priori conception of friendship. The concept, for Kant, is indicative not 
only of relationships that are considered to be acts of philia20, but also the loving part of eros21 
18 This is because Kant's claim is that all sex is of a particular type and the inductive counter argument to this is to 
introduce at least one example in which this is not true. 
19 The deductive response requires the claim that the act of sex does not require that one fully submit to their 
passions. There seems to be no reason why this must occur during the act therefore it is at least possible for a 
morally permissible act of sex to occur.
20 Philia is an ancient Greek word which refers to a sort of brotherly love. It is a love of the virtue of another 
person. 
21 Eros is an ancient Greek word which refers to erotic love. The love of giving oneself to the object of their erotic 
desire is reflected in Kant's friendship rather than the erotic desire to possess the object of the desire sexually. 
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that exists outside of lust. This concept of friendship is the goal for every relation between two 
rational beings. It is incapable of being achieved because of the imperfection of all rational 
beings and their inevitable immorality. The immorality of one agent damages the ability of that 
agent to take part in the mutuality required of the relationship. Things which violate the moral 
laws derived from the CI rob people of the ability to form friendships in ways that fully reflect 
the a priori conception. 
When defining friendship Kant says, “The greatest love I can have for another is to love 
him as myself, for I cannot love anybody more than that; but if I could love him as myself, I can 
do it no otherwise than by being assured that he will love me as much as himself; in that case I 
am requited for what I part with, and thereby regain occupancy of myself.”xix Despite the 
likelihood of either or both of these possibilities of the greatest possible love obtaining being 
impossible, Kant thinks that rational beings should act on this possibility and use it as a model of
their relationships. He thinks that the basic nature of morality aims at perfection even if such a 
thing has never occurred. It is by this reasoning that Kant believes friendship is an important 
attempt for all humans to make and by approaching its perfection people are made better. The 
analysis of friendship that Kant offers is particularly useful when it comes to analyzing sexuality.
Kant believes that sexuality disrupts friendship, one of the highest goods rational beings 
can aim for, by violating the second formulation of the CI. His belief that sex forces two rational 
beings to reduce one another to merely the means of each other’s desires means that it makes the 
requirement of giving oneself over to another in friendship incapable of being realized. There 
seems to be no reason to think that one is incapable of exchanging equal love with another 
person because sex occurs within the relationship, and this argument occurs for all the same 
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reasons as the previous argument about sex itself. It must be acknowledged that Kant does 
indicate a possibility, but not a necessity22. Despite this reiteration it is important to bring up 
friendship because the ideal of friendship is identical to marriage for Kant except for the 
presence of a contract. Kant allows for sexual intercourse in marriage but not friendship solely 
for this reason. If the contract present in marriage does not alter the relationship between the two 
moral agents in any meaningful way then there is an inconsistency in Kant's practical philosophy.
Kant justifies his position on marriage when he claims, “Matrimonium signifies a contract
between two persons, in which they mutually accord equal rights to one another, and submit to 
the condition that each transfers his whole person entirely to the other, so that each has a 
complete right to the other's whole person.”xx The concept of marriage seems to clearly reflect 
Kant's definition of friendship and differs only in its mention of a contract and its use of the 
language of rights. The act of sex is justified in marriage because the contract of marriage unifies
the wills of the two moral agents bound by the contract. Friendship, instead, depends entirely on 
the freely giving of oneself with only the expectation of reciprocation in return. The idea that 
marriage makes certain what friendship can only hope to have obtain is only effective prima 
facie23 as an argument. The reason this argument fails is because the contract of marriage is a 
contract de jure and cannot force a change de facto. Marriage may require by law what 
friendship requires by definition, but the actual change in the relationship between any two moral
agents in either situation is non-existent. Since legislation cannot define the reality of the two 
moral agents there is no difference contributed by the contract other than the social acceptance of
the act of sex between the contracted agents. There is no reason why legislation would alter the 
22 If there is no necessary relationship between sex and objectification then it is insufficient to be a moral law. It 
becomes a case of personal/cultural restriction if particular people or societies have made this sort of 
relationship common, but this is not a sufficient basis for a categorical moral law. 
23 At first glance or at a superficial level.
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relationship between two people, as Kant believes, and because of this there is nothing at the 
substance of Kant's argument, other than the virtue of friendship, allowing for the sexual act to 
be one that does not debase humanity. Kant's dependence on marriage instead of friendship 
seems to be based on some influence apart from reason and seems objectionable as a moral 
claim. 
Kant has failed to make a convincing case for the necessary immorality of sex nor for a 
solution to that problem being found in marriage. It instead seems that the potential for avoiding 
using someone as merely a means in the act of sex may actually lie in the relationship the agents 
have to one another and the thoughts and feelings they share, like love and respect, that define 
that relationship. 
The last important aspect of Kant's analysis of sex is his concept of loving. He offers two 
distinct manners in which a person is loved, “All love is either love that wishes well, or love that 
likes well. Well-wishing love consists in the wish and inclination to promote the happiness of 
others. The love that likes well is the pleasure we take in showing approval of another's 
perfections.”xxi The first type of love, well-wishing, is the type of love that occurs when a person 
acts out of affection for another to increase or maintain their happiness. The second type of love, 
liking well, is not about promoting the happiness of another but about praising his perfection24. 
Anytime someone loves virtuously, they must love in one of these two manners25.
24 It is probably better to think of perfection in this sense as synonymous with virtue.
25 Kant discusses imperfect manners of love in Lectures on Ethics and Metaphysics of Morals. These types of love 
are just variations on the two virtuous ways of loving in which something is lacking in the love (i.e. praising 
someone to be praised rather than for their actual perfections). They aren't of particular importance for this 
discussion. 
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Dworkin and MacKinnon
           Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon are well known as anti-pornography second-
wave feminists. Importantly for the current project, both Dworkin and MacKinnon discuss sexual
objectification extensively in their work. Dworkin's discussion is focused mostly on the 
internalization of the social and the cultural and the relationship this has to gender hierarchy. 
Dworkin's concern with internalization is not on the internalized itself, but on the conditions that 
lead to the internalization of gender hierarchy. Since Dworkin's analysis of the sex problem is 
based on the impact of external forces she would still be considered an externalist by Soble's 
typology. While MacKinnon shares an interest in internalization, her primary concern is with the 
material reality that women navigate as a result of social and cultural structures. In both views, 
the cause of the sex problem is external to the actor and the solution must respond to the external
cause. This chapter will review the arguments about sexual objectification from both Dworkin 
and MacKinnon, analyze them in terms of Kant's moral framework, and critique their approach 
to solving the Kantian sex problem. 
Dworkin
Dworkin is writing from the perspective of an activist rather than a more traditional 
theorist. This can make her theory often times obscured by righteous tirades against the unfair 
institution of gender hierarchy and the privilege it grants men. However, the most basic outline 
of her theory can be drawn from Intercourse and Woman Hating. In Intercourse, Dworkin 
explores the relationship of objectification in the act of intercourse itself. This is more directly 
linked to the Kantian problem of sexuality and respect. However, in Woman Hating Dworkin 
approaches a larger cultural perspective of how attitudes towards women are internalized. 
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Between these two works, her theory will be mapped out as primarily concerned with the 
external force of gender hierarchy which will act to inform and contextualize all psychological 
conditions (i.e. attitudes and thoughts about the nature and value of gender). This overlaps 
MacKinnon's approach, which also discusses internalization, but where Dworkin focuses 
primarily on internalization, MacKinnon focuses primarily on the material reality of the lives of 
women within gender hierarchy which develops as a result of these external social institutions. In
a way, these institutions are created as a result of certain internalized beliefs about gender, but in 
other ways these institutions create a certain reality that people live in and accept as natural. In 
pornography, for instance, women become part of the porn industry because of an internalization 
of gender hierarchy, but the porn industry is also one of the institutions that changes the material 
reality, the actual physical embodied experience of one as one lives one's life, of people and in 
doing so often becomes internalized as a truer reality than proposing that women have a basic 
human dignity. It is because of this cycle of construction that Dworkin's theory of internalization 
and MacKinnon's theory of the material reality of a gender hierarchical hegemony serve each 
other so well.
The main focus of internalization for Dworkin centers around intercourse itself. The way 
that intercourse is perceived and how that perception becomes practice is central to her analysis 
of the sexual objectification of women. Dworkin claims, “.intercourse distorts and ultimately 
destroys any potential human equality between men and women by turning women into objects 
and men into exploiters”.xxii Men become incapable of achieving sexuality without an object of 
that sexuality. This means that for men intercourse, within gender hierarchy, requires the 
objectification of the object of one's sexual desire. An example of this type objectification is 
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found in Bram Stoker's Dracula. When Mina Harker is taken by Dracula and fought for by 
Jonathan Harker. In the case of both men, Mina Harker is reduced to an object to be owned. The 
men fight over her and try to obtain her in an effort to control her sexually. The result is that 
Mina become little more than the object of both Dracula's and Jonathan Harker's desires. The two
fight over the right to own and conquer her. The conquest of her is sexualized by both men. 
Dracula's attempts to take her and turn her are marked by sexual imagery as he comes to her in 
the night and drains her. Upon her return to her husband, Mina reports that Dracula had told her, 
“But as yet you are to be punished for what you have done. You have aided in thwarting me; now
you shall come to my call.”xxiii He intends to own her mind and control her body. Dracula comes 
to treat Mina as a sexual object whose ownership is a direct challenge to Harker. Jonathan Harker
spends the rest of the novel trying to reclaim his wife and finally makes the choice to defeat 
Dracula to secure Mina, even if it means killing her. It is only after the events of the novel that 
Mina bears a child, thus becoming sexually claimed by Jonathan Harker who has successfully 
achieved ownership over her. The story is an example of how men require the objectification of 
women for sex. Jonathan Harker could not use Mina physically until she was his alone. The key 
component of sexual objectification, conquest, requires the ownership or use of women by men. 
If men cannot objectify, then they cannot become truly sexual or masculine. In this 
system, the identity of men is based on their ability to dominate women and women are given 
their identity only as an extension of their objectification and conquest by men. This distortion of
identity and sexuality leads to the impossibility of equality within the system of gender 
hierarchy. As gender hierarchy is ubiquitous and reinforced, this becomes internalized and made 
part of the psychological character of men and women and not just an external force. Dworkin 
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identifies this as a transition from culture to individual action via the internalization of eroticized 
dominance from gender hierarchy.xxiv
This is the fundamental thesis Dworkin holds about heterosexual intercourse within 
American society26. This plays into the Kantian framework of this project by identifying the act 
of sex as fundamental in the systematic reduction of women to merely objects. Dworkin does not
make use of the Kantian terminology but she does engage with Kantian concepts in a meaningful
way. In all of Dworkin's cases of objectification, she interprets them as having women being 
reduced to merely objects. This means that when Dworkin claims that intercourse destroys 
human equality and makes women into objects she means it in the most sinister moral sense that 
can be imagined within the Kantian framework, the denial of humanity (subjecthood). The 
disgust that Dworkin feels is familiar and reflects Kant's own antagonism towards sexuality as a 
process of using people and throwing them away as if they were the rind of a recently devoured 
fruit. In both cases, the primary concern is that the pleasure that is both derived from and drives 
the act of sex is what makes sex so likely to be parasitic and objectifying. While Kant perceived 
this as the result of the passions blinding the rational self, Dworkin sees it as an expression of our
cultural evaluation of women as a gender. Dworkin would see the act of intercourse as the most 
intimate and common practice of gender hierarchy and the realization of the internalization- for 
men and women- of the institutionalization of that hegemony. The result is that Dworkin has 
taken a Kantian view, but pushed the basis of the dehumanizing pleasure into the society. As 
society defines pleasure, it defines the limits of reason.   
The reason this objectification occurs within intercourse is because to be gendered as a 
26 Dworkin also discusses homosexual relationships throughout Intercourse, however, the end result is the same. 
All relationships are constructed in terms of a polarity of dominant-submissive when the cultural model is 
presented as such. Dworkin seems to believe some resistance is possible for homosexuals (men in particular), 
but this resistance is minimal and seems to be forecast to fail. See Intercourse 51-54, 58-61, 152-156, and 183.
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woman is to be made sexual and to be made sexual within the gender hierarchy of American 
culture is to be made submissive. As Dworkin claims, “The woman must be reduced to being this
sexual object to be pleasing to men who will then, and only then, want to fuck her; once she is 
made inferior in this way, she is sensual to men and attracts them to her, and a man's desire for 
her- to use her-is experienced by him as her power over him”.xxv Put another way, “Depravity, 
debauchery, dissoluteness, all connote this exploitation of women, who remain inferior because 
of it, for pleasure”.xxvi The enterprise of objectification is understood in the language of 
domination for Dworkin. The woman, who is identified as sexual, is seen as having a power over
men, those who crave the sexual. This power is inconsistent with the role of man as dominant 
within the gender hierarchy. The result is that man must conquer woman, the sexual must be 
claimed and in being claimed become the object of the conqueror. The social system is set up to 
make women sexualized and men want to conquer them;, because of this it fuels the process of 
objectification through the act of intercourse.  This is why Dworkin's examination of intercourse 
is central to any understanding of her theory of sexual objectification. Sexuality is defined by 
society as the conquest of women, as sexual objects, by men, and it is from these definitions that 
individual action occurs. However, Dworkin does not conceive of society as having merely an 
impact on our choices, but understands it as a force that becomes internalized completely. This is
one of the major differences between Dworkin and Kant. Kant finds freewill a necessity to even 
begin the discourse on morality. Dworkin thinks that society becomes reflected in the 
consciousness of those who are exposed to and influenced by it. She claims, “We function inside 
the socio-religious scenario of right and wrong, good and bad, licit and illicit, legal and illegal, 
all saturated with shame and guilt. We are programmed by the culture as surely as rats are 
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programmed to make the arduous way through the scientist's maze, and that programming 
operates on every level of choice and action”.xxvii It is unfair to push an outright deterministic 
picture onto Dworkin, but it is fair to say that she sees resistance as an unlikely act for those who
have their conscious perception of self and others saturated by the concepts they encounter from 
the social and the cultural matrix. Dworkin seems to see freewill as the first major battle of 
rejecting sexual objectification. People must fight to choose to act counter to the cultural and 
social constructions- gender hierarchy in particular- that they have become indoctrinated with. 
Dworkin believes that in order to fully account for the relations between people at the sexual 
level, regardless of sexual orientation, there must be a consideration of the sociocultural 
environment. As the pressure from these cultural and social influences affect the personal 
attitudes of individual actors, it makes their most intimate act, intercourse, representative and 
perpetuating of those same influences. Dworkin bases her analysis of sexual objectification on 
the overwhelming power of the social and the cultural to impact our choices and attitudes 
through internalization.
Dworkin discusses objectification, a la dominance, in terms of internalized social modes 
of understanding. The social prescription of intercourse as the most concrete act of dominance 
then makes the actors within intercourse play to the script of domination and submission through
sexuality and gender. In discussing the internal aspects of intercourse, Dworkin claims:
Sexual intercourse is not intrinsically banal...It is intense, often desperate. The 
internal landscape is a violent upheaval, a wild and ultimately cruel disregard of 
human individuality, a brazen, high-strung wanting that is absolute and 
imperishable, not attached to personality, no respecter of boundaries; ending not 
in sexual climax but in a human tragedy of failed relationships, vengeful 
bitterness in an aftermath of sexual heat, personality corroded by too much 
endurance of undesired, habitual intercourse, conflict, a wearing away of vitality 
in the numbness finally of habit or compulsion or the loneliness of separation. The
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experience of fucking changes people, so that they are often lost to each other and
slowly they are lost to human hope. The pain of having been exposed, so naked, 
leads to hiding, self-protection, building barricades, emotional and physical 
alienation or violent retaliation against anyone who gets close.xxviii
The view that Dworkin offers here is strikingly Kantian. Her conception of sex is one of a
process that essentially, rather than incidentally, denies the subjecthood of those involved- 
especially women who become dominated through the process. In this process, the man is seen 
as only valuable in terms of his fucking and the woman in terms of her being fucked. Each 
person in the act is valuable merely as a means to an end and never as an end in themselves. The 
act of sex, especially within gender hierarchy, denies the humanity of men and women alike. It 
echoes the Kantian sentiment of discarding people like lemons drained of their juices. In viewing
intercourse in this way, Dworkin understands it as an act which embodies the gender hierarchy 
and perpetuates itself by altering the attitudes and psychological beliefs of the participants so that
they mirror the culture's own model of domination. This model of sex results only after a social 
construction of sorts. Sex becomes the internalization of gender hierarchy acted out in practice. 
The primary model of sex must be a merely physical act, but all real acts of sex depend on a 
level of social projection. There can be no sexual act that exists outside of some attachment of 
meaning, but living in this society the primary meaning that is attached to sex is those that come 
from the gender hierarchy- though also racial and class constructs can also be attached within 
this same theory. The result is a perpetually socially encumbered act of sex that can never exist 
beyond the social- it must either accept the social or actively deny it in an act of resistance. 
The objectification of women within the gender hierarchy occurs in two senses within 
Dworkin's model. In the first sense, women become merely the embodiment of sex and the 
sexual. In the second sense, they are capable of being possessed and therefore fetishized. Both 
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aspects of the woman as object are developed in the cultural and made real at the level of 
interpersonal interaction between the genders. The embodiment of the culture in the act of 
intercourse can mean that sex itself objectifies women. This means that without any other 
context, merely having intercourse within the gender hierarchy of America acts to make sex an 
act of domination and objectification because sex is the gender hierarchy- the signified preceding
the signifier. Dworkin discusses this in detail when she claims:
Intercourse is commonly written about and comprehended as a form of possession
or an act of possession in which, during which, because of which, a man inhabits 
a woman, physically covering her and overwhelming her and at the same time 
penetrating her; and this physical relation to her- over her and inside her- is his 
possession of her. He has her, or, when he is done, he has had her. By thrusting 
into her, he takes her over. His thrusting into her is taken to be her capitulation to 
him as a conqueror; it is a physical surrender of herself to him; he occupies and 
rules her, expresses his elemental dominance over her, by his possession of her in 
the fuck.
     The act itself, without more, is the possession. There need not be a social 
relationship in which the woman is subordinate to the man, a chattel in spirit or 
deed, decorative or hard-working. There need not be an ongoing sexual 
relationship in which she is chronically, demonstrably, submissive or masochistic. 
The normal fuck by a normal man is taken to be an act of invasion and ownership 
undertaken in a mode of predation: colonializing, forceful (manly) or nearly 
violent; the sexual act that by its nature makes her his.xxix
In her view, the sexual act is the culture in action and it embodies hierarchy. The woman is 
colonized and made the object, property, of the man. Sex is the act of objectifying. In sex, a 
woman is merely the object of the man's pleasure. By becoming an object of pleasure the 
woman's object status allows the man to possess her. The possession of the woman becomes 
central to the act of sex. Only insofar as women can be made objects can they be possessed, and 
only insofar as they can be possessed can the act of sex occur. The act itself depends on this 
possession and objectification. There is also a sense in which after the possession occurs and the 
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woman shifts from object back towards humanity she is discarded. As women are known as 
sexual objects the end of the act of sex end not only objectification but the womanhood of the 
objectified. In the end the woman can only be fully recognized in her possession. This in many 
ways reflects Kant's own views in Lectures on Ethics in which he speaks of the dangers of 
intercourse. Kant did not recognize the cultural aspect of sex, but saw that sex inspired in people 
a desire for pleasure that would forsake the humanity of the self and the sexual partner. 
Having shown the internalized process of objectification, the next step is to examine the 
culture Dworkin identifies as jointly being internalized and being caused by those actions which 
embody the internalized. It is in this way that Dworkin understands culture as both constructing 
and being constructed simultaneously.   However, it is important to understand the structure of 
the gender hierarchical culture of America that Dworkin is addressing as the context of male 
domination, and consequently sexual objectification. Dworkin claims:
Intercourse occurs in a context of a power relation that is pervasive and 
incontrovertible. The context in which the act takes place, whatever the meaning 
of the act in and of itself, is one in which men have social, economic, political, 
and physical power over women. Some men do not have all those kinds of power 
over all women; but all men have some kinds of power over all women; and most 
men have controlling power over what they call their women- the women they 
fuck. The power is predetermined by gender, by being male.xxx 
The culture of America is a gender hierarchy, the same hierarchy reflected within the act of 
intercourse. Gender hierarchy is a sociocultural system within the United States, and to varying 
degrees all over the world, while intercourse is a mode by which this system is realized. The 
system provides men with a set of advantages against women solely by gender, while the act of 
sex is an exercise of some or all of those powers over women. The ubiquitous nature of sex and 
its role as a defining feature of the feminine gender within the system makes it the primary mode 
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by which the system is realized in practice. The male is made dominant and the woman 
submissive as a matter of culture. This reality is not limited to merely meaning and psychological
phenomena, but is embodied in the material reality of everyday life. This powerful influence of 
culture is what makes sexual objectification so toxic for Dworkin. It is an expression of 
domination and power from an unjust system.  
The analysis of this system serves as a stark break from the theories of Kant. Dworkin 
proposes that the self is always already encumbered by society, whereas Kant has a conception of
the self as transcendent and unencumbered by sociocultural baggage. Dworkin's theory forces the
Kantian perspective to confront the reality of the sociocultural by constraining the unencumbered
rational self with the reality of one's position in the sociocultural matrix. This is an important 
step in pushing the Kantian moral framework into a post-enlightenment reality. It makes the 
Kantian perspective accept or reject the self as grounded in a body shaped by societal forces. 
This makes the Kantian admit to the internalization of outside forces, or it forces them to reject 
the impact of the social on the self. Lacking any sort of charitable argument that can push for the 
latter, it seems that any successful Kantian morality must meet its contemporary criticism from 
the feminists and the postmodernists. The self must always be addressed relative to its social 
reality to some degree. This degree may vary, but Dworkin has shown that there is need for a 
contemporary Kantian theory to reinterpret the self. Dworkin offers one such theory for this 
interaction in her own work. 
In Woman Hating, Dworkin claims, “The culture predetermines who we are, how we 
behave, what we are willing to know, what we are able to feel”.xxxi If culture has this substantial 
ability to affect the internal states of people, then it is unsurprising that culture is the source of 
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objectification. An additional consequence to this claim is that, in order to alter the internal state 
of people as they perceive gender and intercourse a new culture, i.e. one that is not based on 
gender hierarchy, must be developed to which the internal states can reference. The entire state of
affairs is a holistic problem for Dworkin because the culture poisons personal interaction and 
makes people predetermined by factors outside of their control. However, the fact that the 
problem can be identified and discussed suggests that Dworkin is allowing some freedom for 
resistance- if one is to be charitable and assume the entire enterprise is not founded upon 
contradiction. This resistance takes place in the development of an alternative cultural narrative 
to the gender hierarchy of contemporary America. This counter-culture would postulate a 
potential freedom of people to truly interact in intercourse and not merely be reduced to a slav e 
type relationship of dominance and submission. As Dworkin puts it, “...society interposes itself- 
by creating the necessity for identity, by making rules- between two humans, keeping them 
separate, even during intercourse”.xxxii The perpetuation of gender is then identical to the 
perpetuation of domination. 
The freedom from this domination for Dworkin has a number of steps that work within 
the interplay of the construction/constructing dynamic of culture. In Woman Hating she claims, 
“A first step in the process of liberation...is the radical redefining of the relationship between 
women and their bodies”.xxxiii The new relationship between woman and body that Dworkin is 
advocating is a release from sexuality. Dworkin wants women, and also men, to stop identifying 
their existence with their gender. When people become gendered, then they fall into the 
dichotomous relationship that exists in our society. As men define themselves they also define 
women. Per Beauvoir's The Second Sex, Dworkin claims that men craft themselves and in so 
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doing define women as all that they are not. Men then identify women as the objects of desire 
and their conquest and ownership become necessary for the sexuality of men.  This is how 
women become objectified and how gender necessarily creates a hierarchy. In order to move 
beyond this hierarchy people must place themselves into a post-gender consciousness. This first 
abdication is for the rejection of gender and the gendered state of submission. By rejecting 
gender outright, the woman actively rejects gender hierarchy. This results in a new culture of 
androgyny that replaces the former model of gender hierarchy. 
The next step is to redefine fucking in terms of androgyny instead of in terms of gender 
and domination. Dworkin describes this process when she says, “Specifically, androgynous 
fucking requires the destruction of all conventional role-playing, of genital sexuality as the 
primary focus and value, of couple formations, and of the personality structures dominant-active
(“male”) and submissive-passive (“female”)”.xxxiv The difficulty in actually achieving this sort 
of cultural revolution is that people are often trapped within their culture without an awareness of
their state of being. Thus, to get to the point of androgynous intercourse and a system of 
androgyny, people must begin to understand how they interact with their culture. Our 
relationship to culture is exposed by Dworkin when she claims, “As individuals, we experience 
ourselves as the center of whatever social world we inhabit. We think that we are free and refuse 
to see that we are functions of our particular culture”.xxxv This notion that people are the 
functions of their culture is most important concept that must be embraced for the consciousness 
of a group to be raised. In order for a post-gender society to exist, people must consciously reject
gender. By rejecting gender they alter how their culture is being constructed. When this 
construction is altered then the new culture becomes internalized. This internalization leads to a 
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rejection of hierarchy and dominance which would seem to be the way in which Dworkin 
alleviates the conditions of sexual objectification. This moral imperative for change and 
categorical analysis of the act of intercourse as being defined by its context is captured in one of 
her closing statements in Woman Hating when Dworkin says, “The object is cultural 
transformation. The object is the development of a new kind of human being and a new kind of 
human community. All of us who have ever tried to right a wrong recognize that truly nothing 
short of everything will really do”.xxxvi Because culture so wholly envelopes the lives of human 
beings, it is only through a complete rejection and rebirth that new possibilities emerge. A fully 
recreated culture is needed to alleviate the woes of gender hierarchy in America and to rid 
ourselves of the evil of sexual objectification.
There is also an important note about resistance relative to the constructing/constructed 
model of culture. Resistance which involves consciousness raising requires that there be an 
initial freedom to raise one's consciousness. There is reason to think that people at different 
places in society have varying amounts of freedom to raise their consciousness. This is because 
consciousness raising requires not only introspection, but the desire and freedom to truly 
examine one's life and the world around one's self.  This should suggest that not everyone is 
capable of raising their consciousness to go beyond the colonized state of mind with which they 
approach everyday life. The inability of people to see beyond their internalized gender hierarchy 
raises some serious problems with Dworkin's story. However, insofar as we accept Dworkin's 
model of resistance it must be with the caveat that individual resistance is only valuable if it can 
drive the cultural model beyond gender hierarchy.  
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The Limits of Dworkin
The main problem with Dworkin's work is the confusing place of individual resistance 
within her theory. In some of the passages she gives a deterministic understanding of the 
sociocultural such that it programs people like automatons. In other sections she suggests that in 
order to resist culture individuals must rise above its influence. Either one of these seems to be a 
clear message about the relationship between the social and the individual, but together they 
seem to offer little more than a contradiction. Charitably, the best argument on Dworkin's part is 
that gender hierarchy is total for some and not for others which allows for some resistance that 
then has a chance to break down the system. In this sense, internalization can be rejected and 
replaced with a gender consciousness that sort of mirrors the class consciousness that Marx 
suggests within his work. This would also explain why Dworkin leaves the change in society 
almost exclusively to women. Women are to feminism what the proletariat are to Marxism. In 
each case, the position of the subjugated allows for the subjugated to develop a new 
consciousness beyond their current system. This sort of charitable reading that I offer makes 
Dworkin's argument more rational, but it also fails to account for the complexity of relationships 
that occur within gender hierarchy.
Reading Dworkin gives us the choices of contradiction, inescapable gender hierarchy, or 
a model of gender based consciousness that always seems to be just out of reach. The problem 
with Dworkin is that the scope of her theory is so massive that it fails to account for pockets of 
resistance. A pocket of resistance would be larger than an act of individual resistance and 
significantly more important. A pocket of resistance can be as simple as a group of friends who 
actively examine their own actions as individuals and how those actions are influenced by 
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societal gender hierarchy. A pocket can also be as complex as a cultural product, like television 
or literature, that functions as a catalyst for self-examination and consciousness raising. An 
example of the latter of these types of resistance could be something like That 70's Show, 
Chasing Amy, or Sin City, all of which have examples of resistance against gender hierarchy. As 
Dworkin seems to allow some individuals to develop a raised consciousness, I would suggest 
that some small groups develop this consciousness and alter their lives to act on it. It seems 
tautological to state, but Dworkin herself must have had some point of consciousness raising. 
This consciousness raising then altered her subsequent actions and interactions. It would seem 
that if anyone is to believe this point of view then he or she must become an example of a person
who became aware of this sort of injustice. The question that arises is whether the proponents of 
Dworkin's ideology reject their former internalized models as they publicly adopt this sort of 
feminism. It is impossible to argue for the mental state of anyone, but it seems that certain 
literature or cultural products provoke introspection and that introspection may, though not 
always, lead to resistance against cultural systems like gender hierarchy. This would not shelter 
them from the dominant culture of gender hierarchy, but it would give them the freedom to 
develop meaningful relationships that go beyond domination and subjugation. Dworkin's theory 
needs to offer an account of person to person interactions that actually compose society. She fails
to see the possibility of sex acts that do not destroy their participants as she boldly claims that 
intercourse must always lead to the destruction of a woman's personhood.xxxvii 
Dworkin's theory provides a strong framework for analyzing the sociocultural structure of
gender hierarchy and how it becomes internalized in individuals. It forces us to understand the 
scope of gender hierarchy and the cost it has on our relationships and our sexual activity. 
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However, Dworkin fails to adequately account for the bottom-up construction of society. She 
does not see the interactions that create meaningful resistance not only in individual actors, but in
the relationships of those actors. Dworkin's theory is ill prepared to account for the nuance of 
variations in micro level relationships, and because of this is unable to judge the relative values 
of macro and micro level context. It is this failure to account for the range of external conditions 
and personal intentions and attitudes that Dworkin's theory has an incomplete approach to the 
Kantian sex problem. However, the interplay between the macro and the micro via 
internalization, and the power of large external forces are important contributions that were 
missing from the original Kantian account.  
Catharine Mackinnon
Catharine MacKinnon is a second wave feminist, political philosopher, and legal scholar. 
Her most well-known work revolves around interpreting pornography as an action instead of a 
type of speech. She uses her work on pornography, sexuality, and society to discuss the sexual 
objectification of women. She begins with a macro level analysis of how women are socially 
constructed and then follows with a consideration of the material consequences of that 
construction. MacKinnon's perspective on sexual objectification examines social/individual 
interactions and the role institutions have in this dialogue. In scope, Mackinnon's unmodified 
feminism resembles Marxist theory- a parallel she often makes explicitly. This section will 
explore the theme of sexual objectification within MacKinnon's work, analyze it in terms of 
Kant's moral framework, and critique its effectiveness as a theory of sexual objectification. 
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Mackinnon's Feminism
MacKinnon demands a feminism that understands the situation of women on their own 
terms. She claims that, “A feminism that seeks to understand women's situation in order to 
change it must... identify, criticize, and move those forms and forces that have circumscribed 
women in the world and in the mind.”xxxviii This is what MacKinnon calls feminism unmodified. 
It rejects the traditional feminist theories which merely add women to a theory that had once 
neglected them. These theories- i.e. liberal feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, etc- 
work by examining women from familiar perspectives spawned from within the system of 
gender hierarchy. In contrast, a feminism that is unmodified by any other theory seeks to 
examine women in their own right. 
MacKinnion's feminism also works to identify, criticize, and change those material and 
internalized forces of gender hierarchy that affect the situation of women. However, despite her 
prima facie commitment to changing both the internalized and material situations of women's 
lives, MacKinnon is primarily concerned about the material situation- the reality that women live
in within a gender hierarchy. The material situation, defined as the sum of all material 
components of life as opposed to those which are ideological or attitudinal, seems to produce any
and all forms of internalization while also being the primary external force which leads to 
women being in an oppressive situation. As MacKinnon puts it, “[Gender hierarchy] is at once 
absolutely systematic and absolutely random: systematic because one group is its target and lives
knowing it; random because there is no way of telling who is next on the list. “xxxix The 
systematic abuse of women and its individual constituents are what compose the material reality 
of gender hierarchy. This can be seen and measured in reduced pay, sexual abuse, rape, and the 
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treatment of pornography as speech. In all cases, women become differentiated from men by way
of the social, political, and cultural. At the social level, women have less say and their opinions 
become overshadowed by those of men. This form of gender hierarchy actively denies women 
the ability to shape and understand their own reality by restraining their social presence and 
social authority. The political aspect of gender hierarchy becomes material in the failure to 
recognize the claims of women as politically relevant and the denial of women voice in the 
political process. The policy formulation about women's health, fair pay for women, and 
legislation about sexual assault (largely against women) are all crafted by and decided by men 
who hold most governmental policy making positions. In addition to the disproportionate 
distribution of power in the social and political spheres of life, women tend to be culturally 
perceived and marketed as objects for consumption. Within a system of gender hierarchy, women
become the target of retail stores who push an ideal model of womanhood, but women 
themselves become objects to be consumed through prostitution, stripping, pornography, and by 
being a symbol of status for men to collect and display. In each of these classes of treatment, 
women are made less than men and subservient to men. This breeds the internalization of gender 
hierarchy wherein the threat of being the next victim of the systematic abuse of women leads 
women to expect and act on the threat of that abuse. This is how women have their place in the 
world shaped, and it is how women understand their reality. It is because of this relationship 
between the material and the internalized that a lot of MacKinnon's work in feminism seems to 
focus on material reality rather than dealing with the resulting internalization. 
The reality that is perpetuated for women by gender hierarchy is sexual objectification. 
This is the central destructive feature of gender hierarchy and the primary concern of 
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MacKinnon's feminism.  As she puts it, “Sexual objectification is the primary process of the 
subjection of women. It unites act with word, construction with expression, perception with 
enforcement, myth with reality. Man fucks woman; subject verb object.”xl When we construct 
sexuality as something that men do or force upon women, then the woman becomes nothing but 
the object of sexuality. In the gender hierarchy model, the reality of sex for women is being an 
object. The woman becomes merely a means to pleasure and never recognized as a subject in 
herself. In recent history, pornography has moved beyond vaginal intercourse, from which the 
woman can get physical pleasure via clitoris, to acts like fellatio from which the woman gets no 
physical pleasure and are only sources of psychological pleasure after training. This general 
trend reflects the movement within gender hierarchy of rejecting women's human desire for 
pleasure for the treatment of women as a means to the pleasure of men. It also reflects the 
movement from the material reality, i.e. the acts of real people captured in pornography, to the 
internalization of that reality, i.e. the training of women to see the fellatio of men as being as 
pleasurable as it appears in pornography. 
This analysis keeps with Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative about 
treating people always as ends in themselves and never merely as a means to some end. 
MacKinnon's feminism seeks to overcome sexual objectification and help engender the treatment
of women as ends in themselves. MacKinnon's feminism enacts this change via consciousness 
raising. This is described by MacKinnon when she says that, “…[the]feminist method is 
consciousness raising: the collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social 
experience, as women live through it.”xli This feminism seeks to allow women to be evaluated as 
free and rational subjects and in doing so make a deontological demand that men have a duty to 
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never treat women as merely a means. This works within Kant's moral framework and seeks to 
secure women equitable ethical treatment within their lives. This is the first step to change 
because it is the realization that change needs to occur. This aligns the problem identified by 
MacKinnon's feminism and its solution to Kant's moral theory. 
MacKinnon's feminism approaches the problem of sexual objectification and its solution 
externally. It identifies the cause of sexual objectification and the oppression of women as being 
caused by gender hierarchy, an external force constituted by various superstructures that 
perpetuate a particular material reality for women. This reality becomes internalized and is 
recognized at its most fundamental level in the sexual interactions that occur between men and 
women. This ideology becomes embodied in these acts and these acts become captured in the 
lens of the pornographer. In this way the marketing of sex becomes at once a representation of 
normal sex within gender hierarchy, and is the embodied practice of that sex since pornography 
captures real people performing these acts. It codifies the sexual objectification of women and 
the domination of women by men. This domination of women becomes eroticized in gender 
hierarchy. As MacKinnon puts it, “...feminism is a theory of how the erotization of dominance 
and submission creates gender, creates woman and man in the social form in which we know 
them.”xlii This eroticization becomes embodied in, among other institutions, pornography. 
Pornography captures the domination of actual women in the form of supposed speech, and this 
speech teaches men how to treat women- i.e. to dominate them. The presence of this power 
relationship in pornography and its role in promoting the eroticization of domination has made it 
central to MacKinnon's feminism and its analysis of power. 
The power relationship that is gender hierarchy defines the lives of both men and women.
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As MacKinnon puts it, “Sexuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed, 
embodies it, not the reverse. Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we 
know them, by the social requirements of its dominant form, heterosexuality, which 
institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is
the lynchpin of gender inequality.”xliii The sexual arrangement of men and women is both the 
result constructed by gender hierarchy and how gender hierarchy is constructed. It is constructed 
by gender hierarchy because it becomes the embodiment of the sociocultural discourse on sex, 
and it constructs gender hierarchy because the everyday treatment of women and the constant 
threat of being treated as merely a sexual object for the use of men shapes the reality of women 
everywhere within the system. This means that sex is the battleground of objectification. It is the 
place where men are made human and women are made into pleasure. They become the pleasure 
of conquest when men take them by force and fulfill the social script. In other words, 
“Objectification makes supremacist sexuality a material reality of women's lives, not just a 
psychological, attitudinal, or ideological one.”xliv This shows MacKinnon's predilection to 
observe objectification from a material and external standpoint and not merely as a matter of 
perception. 
Pornography
MacKinnon's paradigm case of the material reality of sexual objectification is 
pornography. Pornography27 functions simultaneously as an industry of last resort for women, a 
protected form of speech, an act of forced sex (embodied practice), and as a cultural guide to 
sexual desire for heterosexual men. As Mackinnon puts it,“...as the human becomes a thing and 
27 For the purposes of this thesis I will only address the impact of gender hierarchy on heterosexual relationships. 
This is not indicative of a homogeneity between different types of sexual attractions within a system of gender 
hierarchy, but it is done to maintain the succinctness of this particular research. 
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the mutual becomes one-sided and the given becomes stolen and sold, objectification comes to 
define femininity, and one-sidedness comes to define mutuality, and force comes to define 
consent as pictures and words become the forms of possession and use through which women are
actually possessed and used.”  xlv This entire process is captured in the case of Linda Marchiano. 
Marchiano was coerced into having sex by gun point for the film Deep Throat. The act of sex 
became one-sided as the man got pleasure and the woman was forced to give fellatio to the point 
of vomiting. She becomes coerced and her coercion is captured on film and turned into speech. 
Her feminine nature is defined by her objectification and use, while the sexual nature of the act is
defined by its force. In the end, the possession and use of Marchiano in the film led to her 
possession and use in life. The film became evidence of her consent, and her consent became 
evidence of the ownership of the film by her rapists. The reality of her situation became reduced 
to speech and her attackers became protected by the first amendment. 
Since women are on average paid less than men in almost every profession, it is not 
surprising that the pornography industry offers relatively high wages to entice women into 
selling their bodies. This industry pays women to have sex and then markets images of that sex 
to millions of consumers (mostly men). There is no difference between pornography and 
prostitution from this perspective, and it is because of this that pornography is seen as an 
industry of last resort for women. This is because, “[Pornography] exploits women's sexual and 
economic inequality for gain. It sells women to men as and for sex.”xlviThe commodification of 
women is central to MacKinnon's analysis of pornography, and it is part of the external context 
that constitutes the objectification of women. If women did not live in a society of economic and 
sexual inequality, then pornography would not be such an exploitative industry. As is, 
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pornography is little more than coerced sex because of the wages it offers compared to the other 
wages that women are offered. It is part of a larger social context that shapes what material 
choices are available to women. This is the first sense in which sexual objectification occurs 
because of and causes an external social reality.  
Since the focus of the debate on pornography is not on the sex women are paid for and 
coerced into, but on the speech rights of pornographers then it becomes clear that pornography is
legally seen as a form of speech. This undermines that the reality of pornography is the sex that 
is produced into the image and not the image itself. The greater weight given to the image is 
itself a rejection of the subjecthood of women. It gives more value to the speech rights of 
pornographers than to the bodily integrity of the women who are coerced into sex. MacKinnon 
criticizes the view that pornography is speech because it requires actual acts to occur for it to be 
made. The experiences of real people cannot be justified and protected as speech. She goes on to 
claim that even if pornography is considered to be speech then it would be a type of speech that 
categorically demeans women and should be censored as hate speech. These two strains of 
thought meet when she says, “Social inequality is substantially created and enforced- that is, 
done- through words and images.”xlvii The enforcement of inequality comes from unrestrained 
hate speech that demeans women and this speech is produced only through the coercion of actual
women into sexual acts. The result of the speech status of pornography is the industrialization 
and legal protection of the commodification of women. It is a jurisprudence that protects the 
powerful at the expense of the powerless.  
The sex that comprises the contents of pornography is the embodied practice of sexual 
objectification. It treats women as commodities and denies their humanity. In Only Words, 
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MacKinnon claims, “Once you are used for sex, you are sexualized. You lose your human status. 
You are sex, therefore unworthy of belief and impossible to violate.”xlviii This means that women 
become merely a means to an end and never an end in themselves. They are the means to profit 
and to pleasure, but they never seen as fully human. They become objects that are mass produced
via pornography, used, and discarded.  
The use of pornography transforms it from the reproduction of an act of coerced sex to a 
cultural guide to how sex ought to be. Pornography is not only the embodied practice of 
objectification, but it spreads like a virus through its population of subscribers. As MacKinnon 
says, “Pornography does not simply express or interpret experience; it substitutes for it.”xlix The 
use of pornography for masturbation elevates it to sexual fantasy. This fantasy becomes the 
desire that drives the viewer, and is carried over into their attitudes and expectations about sex. 
This means that the internalization of pornographic images inspired particular attitudes and 
intentions that then cause the embodiment of that objectification to obtain for novel men and 
women who reproduce the act captured by the pornographer (i.e. coerced sexual activity). 
The full impact of pornography is captured by MacKinnon when she says, “Pornography 
makes the world a pornographic place through its making and use, establishing what women are 
said to exist as, are seen as, are treated as, constructing the social reality of what a woman is and 
can be in terms of what can be done to her, and what a man is in terms of doing it.”l Pornography
creates a world where womanhood is defined by objecthood. Women are made fungible, inert, 
and lacking in bodily integrity. Women become the object of sex and when they are sexualized 
they are made the object of men's desire. Women are then objects to be conquered and the 
conquering defines the sexual act. This is what MacKinnon means when she says that 
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pornography has shifted the social reality of women. The result is the mass sexual objectification
of women in gender hierarchical societies. This means that sex that does not result in the 
treatment of women as merely a means to an end is nigh impossible. 
Law, State, and Feminist Jurisprudence
One of the problems of pornography is its legal status as speech. Pornography functions 
as an industry that commodifies women, but the underlying problem is the facilitation of this 
effect by the legal system. The state serves a major role in MacKinnon's feminism and 
specifically in her theory of objectification. The state is a superstructure that justifies and 
perpetuates gender hierarchy. As MacKinnon claims, “Gender is a social system that divides 
power. It is therefore a political system.”li The system of gender hierarchy is embodied in the acts
of individuals, but it is perpetuated at the level of governance. The inability in the state to either 
protect the selfhood of women or to care to try has implicated the liberal state in a failure to 
adequately address the material and social reality of women. 
MacKinnon's feminist theory of the state is basically that, “The state is a male in the 
feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. The liberal 
state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a 
gender- through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies.”lii The
idea MacKinnon is pushing is that the liberal state is one in which men and women are treated 
identically, the way men would choose to treat someone. This means that the treatment is not 
rationally constructed to the person, but biased based on gender. This means that because men 
prescribe to gender hierarchy so then must the state. As men objectify women so too does the 
state. This objectification is, however, only truly systematic because of the state. This is because 
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it legitimates the norms and social relations of gender hierarchy. Since the liberal state is partially
defined by its control over the means of violence then it seems safe to say that it uses this power 
to define the relations between men and women. The definition happens perpetually at the legal 
level and is enforced by the power of the state itself. This means that one must divide the 
superstructure between the form of the state, that which has the power to enforce, and the law, 
that which is enforced by the power. Since the law both constrains and frees people to act in 
certain ways it would seem that the law is the primary external process that legitimates and 
perpetuates gender hierarchy. 
For Mackinnon, “Law, as words in power, writes society in state form and writes the state
onto society. The rule form, which unites scientific knowledge with state control in its 
conception of what law is, institutionalizes the objective stance as jurisprudence.”liii Here 
MacKinnon expresses a complex relationship that defines the legal system. The law acts as a 
reflection of the liberal state and the liberal state is an embodiment of a particular theoretical 
model. The model of the liberal state is one of modernity and science. The liberal state embodies 
a scientific, objective, view of the world. However, since the state itself is socially created the 
objective view it has is actually a particular subjective view- a male view. The state views men 
and women in terms of unencumbered selves per liberal tradition, and this view perpetuates itself
when the law fails to distinguish between the reality of men and women in a gender hierarchical 
society. If women demand more pay for the jobs they do then the liberal state replies that anyone 
who works those particular jobs gets the same wages. This means that the state is blind to women
having a socially defined workspace that is almost entirely occupied by a single gender. This 
blindness to social reality leads to a perpetuation or exacerbation of gender hierarchy. Even in 
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cases where women and men should have a shared interest, i.e. laws on rape, the legal system 
looks at rape from the perspective of only men who are the primary perpetrators of rape. It 
demands that the man be shown to have known he violated someone, instead of demanding that 
the perpetrator prove that he did not harm the victim. Because the liberal state perceives itself as 
objective, it then perceives its laws as just in their blindness to social reality. This dependence on 
the uninhibited self and its impact on the legal systems interaction with women shows how 
gender hierarchy saturates the legal discourse. 
In order for the context of society to change, the laws which perpetuate and legitimize 
that society must also change. However, since the state is static in its monopoly of force, the only
option is to try and change the state at the legal level. This would mean changing legal action at 
the legislative and judicial level since the legislature creates laws that reflect the interests of the 
liberal state. The judicial level offers the unique ability to allow individuals to directly change 
the interpretation of what is legally relevant. If the jurisprudence of these courts is changed to a 
feminist jurisprudence then it means going beyond a blind acceptance of unencumbered citizens. 
It means questioning different perspectives on reality. This is MacKinnon's solution to the 
problem of sexual objectification. As she puts it:
A jurisprudence is a theory of the relation between life and law. In life, “woman” 
and “man” are widely experienced as features of being, not constructs of 
perception, cultural interventions, or forced identities. Gender, in other words, is 
lived as ontology, not as epistemology. Law actively participates in this 
transformation of perspective into being. In liberal regimes, law is a particularly 
potent source and badge of legitimacy, and site and cloak of force. The force 
underpins the legitimacy as the legitimacy conceals the force. When life becomes 
law in such a system, the transformation is both formal and substantive. It reenters
life marked by power.liv
 If gender hierarchy is constructed, perpetuated, and legitimized through the state which protects 
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industries, like pornography, that perpetuate the objectification of women and their material and 
social oppression, then the only way to resist such a hegemony is to effectively undermine the 
system by changing the application of the law in a way that challenges the theory of the law 
which questions the underlying theoretical construction of the state. This means having 
individuals that are conscious of gender hierarchy acting to challenge the objective liberal stance 
of the law in such a way as to provide a jurisprudence that effectively creates change in the 
interpretation of what freedoms and constraints individuals have. A good example of this sort of 
action is the Minneapolis and Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinances of the 1980's. In these 
cases, the municipalities were brought ordinances by MacKinnon, Dworkin, and other concerned
citizens. These citizens rallied together to propose a change in the legal status of pornography for
these cities, i.e. the criminalization of pornography. This change would embody a resistance 
against gender hierarchy, and the achievement of that goal through consciousness raising and 
feminist jurisprudence. If the ordinances had not been overturned or similar activism had taken 
their place then the jurisprudence would have become internalized and act as a catalyst for 
individual resistance. The result of this resistance would be a solution to the Kantian sex 
problem. If the systematic Kantian sex problem is caused by the context of society, i.e. gender 
hierarchy, and that context changes, as expected from a feminist jurisprudence, then the 
systematic sex problem should be removed. 
The Individual: Consciousness and Resistance
There are two problems with MacKinnon's account of the problem of objectification and 
its solution. The first problem is that MacKinnon's systematic view of the sex abandons the 
individual to the whims of social pressure without the possibility of conscious resistance. The 
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second problem is that MacKinnon's solution of consciousness raising leading to revolutionary 
changes at the level of jurisprudence does not effectively answer the question of what the 
mechanism of consciousness raising is. I will address each of these in turn and show that despite 
the fullness of MacKinnon's theory, it fails to adequately solve the Kantian sex problem. 
The first problem is concerned with MacKinnon's interpretation of agency. MacKinnon 
appears to be claiming that a certain set of social pressures limit the actions of humans to such a 
degree that without changing the social system that is in place one cannot allow for a truly free 
person. This is indicated by MacKinnon's belief that the Kanitan sex problem is a systematic 
problem. Since all men have some sort of power over all women, then there is reason to think 
that they could never recognize a woman as having full subjecthood. This is because power, for 
MacKinnon, is the ability to shape the social or material reality of a person. As men have the 
ability to control or dominate women then they have a certain type of power. This is the same 
power that the liberal state has over its citizens. This sort of power results in the inability of the 
powerful to treat the oppressed as fully human or as true ends in themselves. MacKinnon's 
theory removes the ability of individuals to act as free agents. The problem with this is that either
there is no Kantian style problem because the actors are not free agents, or MacKinnon's theory 
is too bold and asserts a sort of inertness to people as merely being present in a system of gender 
hierarchy. If the first proposition is true then the world is in a sort of deterministic state, but if the
second proposition is true than MacKinnon's theory of the individual within society is 
incomplete or somehow skewed by her macro level focus. In MacKinnon's theory the impact of 
the social is so complete that:
...men author scripts to their own advantage, women and men act them out; that 
men set conditions, women and men have their behavior conditioned; that men 
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develop developmental categories through which men develop, and women 
develop or not; that men are socially allowed selves hence identities with 
personalities into which sexuality is or is not well integrated, women being that 
which is or is not integrated, that through the alterity of which a self experiences 
itself as having an identity; that men have object relations, women are the objects 
of those relations; and so on.lv 
 I tend to believe that the problem is that MacKinnon has failed to fully account for the 
individual. Her view of the workings at the systematic level failed to account for individual 
resistance or even the range of various conscious states that the agents within a gender 
hierarchical society could possess. This is because MacKinnon sees individuals as part of the 
system of gender hierarchy, rather than in a dialogue with that system at the level of their own 
decisions, thoughts, and attitudes. 
This leads to the problem of consciousness raising. In MacKinnon's original account, 
people become feminist actors through consciousness raising. This seems to occur when people 
come together and develop a sort of group awareness of the reality in which they live, However, 
there is no real mechanism for how this occurs in MacKinnon's seemingly deterministic view of 
society, and there is no explanation for how anyone began questioning the seemingly complete 
and total control that men have over women within society. This problem relates back to 
MacKinnon's lack of consideration of the internal mental life of individuals and how this 
interplays with the massive social systems of her theory. In order for MacKinnon to offer a 
complete theory of gender hierarchy and sexual objectification, she would have to account for 
individual nuance and resistance while offering a more detailed explanation of the mechanisms 
of consciousness raising and internalization. If the internal part of individuals is left out of this 
sort of moral theory then the theory will fail to fully consider the agency of these individuals and 
how they interact with the external world (i.e. the nuanced give and take relationship of 
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internalization and resistance). 
Nussbaum and Langton
The feminist philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton are the contemporary 
heirs to the arguments of Dworkin and MacKinnon. They differ in the results of their approach, 
but both of these writers make use of analytic philosophy in their consideration of sexual 
objectification. Nussbaum's externalist approach builds off of the idea of context that Dworkin 
and MacKinnon use in their analysis of sex as microcosm of gender hierarchy. In contrast, 
Langton's internalist argument builds off of Dworkin and MacKinnon's discussion of the 
internalization of societal pressures. As analytic philosophers, Nussbaum and Langton share the 
common criticism of Dworkin and MacKinnon that they fail to adequately define sexual 
objectification, and in doing so, fail to provide a complete analysis of the nuance of 
objectification. This thesis will first turn to Nussbaum's arguments, then Langton's, and conclude 
with a criticism of both. 
As Nussbaum claims in Sex and Social Justice, “..we are going to be at least as interested 
in the treatment that is denied to persons as in the treatment that is accorded them.”lvi In 
examining objectification, it is important to understand how one objectifies a person, but it is 
also important to understand how one treats a person appropriately. In this way one can 
determine the difference between being treated as an object and being treated as a subject. This 
difference highlights moral importance of the object status forced upon free and rational agents. 
It will show what important parts of the human experience are denied by treating people as 
objects. When defining objectification Nussbaum says, “I suggest that in all cases of 
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objectification what is at issue is a question of treating one thing as another: One is treating as an
object what is really not an object, what is, in fact, a human being.”lvii The central issue between 
these two points becomes, in what ways should people be treated and in what ways are they 
treated when they are objectified. Nussbaum's work suggests that objectification is a multifarious
concept and can be imagined in a number of interconnected but rationally distinct ways. 
When she is defining objectification Nussbaum offers this list28:
1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-
determination
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity
4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the 
same type and/or (b) with objects of other types.
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary integrity, as something that 
it is permissible to break up, smash, break into
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if 
any) need not be taken into account 
7. Denial of Subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experiences and 
feelings (if any) need not be taken into accountlviii
In her chapter “Objectification” she goes into considerable detail about how each of these
ways of objectifying another person can occur and considers what, if any, harm29 occurs to one's 
humanity as a result of being treated in this way. In her analysis, the most troubling of these 
types of objectification is instrumentality. Instrumentality, she claims, seems to almost always 
lead to an unwanted denial of autonomy and subjectivity within adults. The act of treating 
someone as an instrument is the central idea of use within Kant's ethical theory (treating people 
as merely a means). It is not necessarily evil, but it seems that if someone is ever immorally 
objectified then they are at least treated instrumentally. Instrumentality is particularly 
28 Nussbaum claims that this list is not exhaustive and that more work must be done.
29 Harm as I am using it here and as Nussbaum uses it in her paper is talking about moral harm to a person's 
humanity. This clarification is important for keeping the concept of harm within a Kantian moral framework and
not bleeding into a consequentialist ethical theory.
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problematic if the objectified person is treated as merely or solely as an instrument.lix  The 
particularities of the analysis of each of these types of objectification is interesting, but the 
primary feature that is of concern for this thesis is how these different forms of objectification 
achieve their moral status, and Nussbaum seems to suggest the answer is the same across the 
board for each of these types of objectification. The thesis of her chapter “Objectification” is, 
“Under some specifications, objectification...is always morally problematic. Under other 
specifications, objectification has features that may be either good or bad, depending on the 
overall context... Some features of objectification... may in fact in some circumstances...be either
necessary or wonderful features of sexual life.”lx If Nussbaum believes that every form of 
objectification, including the scrutiny evoking instrumentality, can become a necessary or 
wonderful part of sexual life then one must ask what factor changes the morality of the same 
type of action. The answer seems to be, as Kant, Dworkin, and MacKinnon suggest, the context 
in which the act occurs. Nussbaum's variety of context-sensitive moral theory, however, differs 
greatly from all of those proposed by these other theorists. 
Nussbaum rejects Kant, Dworkin, and MacKinnon because of their inability to fully grasp
the importance and nuance of context in cases of sexual objectification. She seems to agree with 
Kant that the relationship between the sexual actors is important in the moral judgment of 
objectification, however, Kant's solution of marriage to contractually maintain mutual respect 
between the parties having sex is rejected. This is because it fails to account for larger social 
pressures and the problem of marriage as a construct of gender hierarchy. Kant's solution also 
fails to allow the act of sex to be morally acceptable even after marriage, instead it only makes it 
a tolerable transgression.lxi Nussbaum agrees with Dworkin and MacKinnon when she claims, 
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“...we need to be able to ask how our judgments of the cases [of sexual objectification] are 
influenced by larger issues of social context and social power.”lxii Each act of objectification 
occurs against the backdrop of social forces. Nussbaum seems to support the analysis of sexual 
objectification in terms of gender hierarchy per Dworkin and MacKinnon, but she also seems to 
think that there is another layer of consideration that is important. Nussbaum seems to suggest 
that Dworkin and MacKinnon have the opposite problem of Kant in that they focus too much on 
the macro level processes of gender hierarchy. Instead of opting for either of these solutions, 
Nussbaum would prefer to examine the context of each individual relationship within the greater 
context of gender hierarchy. This would allow for her to account for personal resistance against 
gender hierarchy at the level of personal sexual relationships and still consider the influence of 
macro level social forces. Nussbaum says:
...In the matter of objectification, context is everything. MacKinnon and Dworkin grant 
this when they insist, correctly, that we assess male-female relations in the light of the 
larger social context and history of female subordination and insist on differentiating the 
meaning of objectification in these contexts from its meaning in either male-male or 
female-female relations. But they rarely go further, looking at the histories and 
psychologies of individuals... In a sense the fine details of context are of little interest to 
them, involved as they are in a political movement; on the other hand, they are of 
considerable interest to us, for I shall argue that in many if not all cases, the difference 
between an objectionable and a benign use of objectification will be made by the overall 
context of the human relationship in question.lxiii   
  
In this quote Nussbaum's Kantian distinction between being treated as an object and 
being treated as merely an object seems to come out. The consideration of context is important 
for understanding whether the act of objectification occurs within a general appreciation of the 
objectified person's humanity, or if the act of objectification occurs in such a way as to deny that 
humanity by treating the person as merely an object. Nussbaum seems to think this distinction is 
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not made from the beginning of a sex act, as Kant seems to, but that it occurs before and after the
act as the context by which it gains its moral value. Nussbaum's theory allows for sexual 
objectification to be acceptable in cases where the person's humanity is fully recognized. This 
allows her to maintain a Kantian ethical theory, but reject many of the claims that have been 
made about sex. 
As Nussbaum says, “In each case, a human being is being regarded and/or treated as an 
object, in the context of a sexual relationship.”lxiv This is what makes an act one of sexual 
objectification, however, it is the context of the sexual relationship that makes the objectification 
morally acceptable or not. This nuanced externalist analysis of the problem of sexual 
objectification seems to be the best possible way of dealing with the external factors, like 
context, of sexual objectification, however, it also seems to fall short of being a complete theory. 
The focus Nussbaum has on the relationship between the two people fails to account for the 
internal dimension of the acts of objectification. One objectifies someone when one treats them 
as an object, but if these acts are changed by context then it seem likely that they are also 
changed by attitude. I could have a seemingly loving relationship with my lover, but then I could 
think to myself about how much I use her for my own pleasure. This attitude about my action 
would alter its moral character within a Kantian framework even if the context was humanity 
affirming. This is because for an act to be morally good it must be done with a good will. One 
must act with the correct intention because the act is defined by its intention. For instance, if I 
give you a weapon for free so that you might kill yourself then my ill intention makes my act an 
evil act. 
Rae Langton attempts to expand Nussbaum's theory and shifts her focus from context and
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personal relationships to psychological states like the attitude of solipsism. In responding to 
Nussbaum's work, Langton says, “I take this to be a particularly helpful proposal about what 
'object' amounts to, in the notion of 'treating as an object', and this is, in my view, at least half the
story. The other half, as we shall see, rests not on what an 'object' is, but on what 'treating as' 
amounts to.”lxv In this claim, Langton refers to Nussbaum's project of finding objectification by 
considering how objects are treated and defined by this treatment. Langton desires to look at how
we define 'treating' and what this definition does to the relationship that Nussbaum has begun 
exploring. Langton believes that one can treat someone in a way passively or actively and via act
or attitude. The concept of treatment leads Langton to expand Nussbaum's initial list of manners 
of objectification and define the different ways in which the act of treating alters the way by 
which each manner of objectification obtains (i.e. actively, passively, via attitude, or via action)30.
This conception of treatment is central to Langton's response to Nussbaum and will be the basis 
for the development of her theory of sexual solipsism. Langton says:
Teasing out a plurality of features associated with objecthood is, I suggest, only 
half the task. In this idea of 'treating someone as an object', we need to look not 
only at the notion of an object, but also at the notion of treatment. Here too we 
confront a plurality, albeit a different one. 'Treat' is a wide-ranging verb that has 
so far been functioning as a dummy, standing in for a host of different attitudes 
and actions. 'Treating' may be a matter of attitude or act: it may be a matter of 
how one depicts or represents someone, or a matter of what one more actively 
30 Langton's expansion to Nussbaum's list includes: Reduction to body: one treats it as identified with its 
body, or body parts. Reduction to appearance: one treats it primarily in terms of how it looks, or how it 
appears to the senses. Silencing: one treats it as silent, lacking the capacity to speak. (2009, 228-229)
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does to someone.lxvi 
Langton's claim can be broken down into a number of salient claims about treatment. The
first claim is that the verb treat can be understood as an attitude or action taken towards someone.
One can treat a woman as an object by understanding her to be his property regardless of his 
actions towards her. In contrast, one can treat a woman as an object through an action like date 
rape, but hold the attitude that she wanted it and his action was consensual. In both cases there is 
a sort of reduction of the woman’s humanity, but cases like the latter have traditionally drawn the
most attention in feminist theory. The internalization of objectifying attitudes towards women, 
however, is a significant problem that results when gender hierarchy becomes internalized and it 
can change the nature of our actions from good or wanted to evil, controlling, manipulative, 
and/or deceptive. This concept of attitude will be explored further when sexual solipsism is 
discussed. 
Treatment, for Langton, can also be active or passive. One treats actively when one does 
something to someone and one treats passively when one denies something about the person 
being objectified. Actively, I can enslave a person and treat them as an instrument for my 
purposes. Passively, I can deny that a person who works for me is anything besides a force of 
production and in this way reduce them to merely an instrument. In addition to the active/passive
divide, there is also the possibility of objectification via representation or depiction. This would 
be the issue central to pornography, literature, and policy decisions. When one represents a group
of people as objects in any of the ways offered by Nussbaum or Langton then one is objectifying 
that group. The representation of women in pornographic magazines is a form of treatment as an 
object because it treats women, as a unified group, as though they are sexual objects for male use
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and the male gaze. The reduction to object status in representation can function as a sort of 
education31 for the masses. 
In each of these understandings of 'treatment' the sharpened definition is one which 
becomes morally relevant. It is because of this that treatment becomes a central concern for 
Langton and for sexual objectification.  Perhaps the most curious thing about treatment for 
Langton is that the active violation of one's personhood (treating actively as an object) requires 
that one recognize the personhood of the person in order to reject it. If one did not recognize the 
full humanity in a person then one would only incidentally (treat passively as an object) reduce 
someone to an object.lxvii If one considers the case of rape, the desire to dominate the will of 
another person requires the rapist to admit to the victim having a will. If the rapist did not admit 
to the other person having a will then the act of forcing the victim to do something against her 
will would become impossible. The act of domination requires a deliberate violation of one's 
personhood and therefore the treatment of that person as an object.
The complexities of treatment exist outside of the context-sensitive approach of 
Nussbaum and require a consideration of the attitudes and intentions of the agents objectifying. 
Active violation, for instance, requires an acceptance of personhood in order to deny it. In 
contrast, the passive act of not recognizing someone's personhood means that one cannot have an
attitude or intention about the action, the objectification must be merely incidental. This way the 
morality of objectification moves from merely the way in which one becomes object-like to how 
one treats someone as an object. This initial movement from context to psychological states 
allows for a transition from the externalist approaches to Langton's own internalist approach. 
31 This is especially relevant in terms of Bourdieu's theory that education begets and preserves hegemony by being
the primary point of contact with culture. See his essay “Systems of Education and Systems of Thought,” 
International Social Science Journal 19 (1967). 
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After Langton's critique of Nussbaum's argument, she offers her own theory of 
objectification as it relates to attitudes and psychological states. This theory is based off of a 
thought experiment concerning solipsism. In this experiment, one must imagine two worlds; a 
world in which solipsism is true, but the actor thinks it is not and the reverse world. In the first 
world, the actor treats a number of things (automatons that resemble people) as though they are 
people, and in the second, the actor treats a number of people as if they are things 
(automatons).lxviii The former attitude seems bizarre, but is not morally significant (like talking to 
an ashtray). The latter attitude, however, seems morally problematic because it denies the person 
his status as an end in himself. This rejection of the person's subject nature seems unwanted and 
morally harmful. This is the beginning thought experiment which Langton uses to set the stage 
for her internalist theory. 
Solipsism can be either a metaphysical reality (there are no other subjects) or 
dispositional (I treat others as if they are only objects and not subjects).lxix One of the main goals 
of most philosophy since existentialism is to reject this claim to solipsism. The philosopher 
desires to win back reality metaphysically and dispositionally to act as a moral agent. The latter 
is of particular concern for the project of this thesis and for Langton. She says, “If one is to avoid
the solipsistic worlds, some of the beings with whom one interacts must be people (not things); 
and one must treat them as people (not as things).”lxx Since there is a problem with the 
knowledge of other minds and the sureness of the existence of other subjects, there is no way to 
fully reject the skeptical solipsist claim that there are no other people in the world. This rejection,
however, is of little importance morally. If the solipsist is right, then the act of being a moral 
agent is akin to talking to ashtrays, however, if the solipsist is wrong then the act becomes an act 
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of evil against humanity and particular people. This being said, the most rational choice is to 
reject the dispositional claim of the solipsist before the metaphysical claim is answered. 
Therefore, one must change his attitudes towards people so that he always recognizes them as 
subjects and not as objects and in so doing avoid sliding into a solipsistic attitude. 
Langton puts the discourse about solipsism within the framework of sexual 
objectification when she says, “Among these local versions of the global solipsisms with which I
began are two that have a sexual aspect. In the first, someone treats a thing as a human being, in 
a context that is sexual; in the second, someone treats a human being as an object, in a context 
that is sexual.”lxxi The first of these sexual solipsisms is how one would understand the treatment 
of pornography and the second is how one would understand the treatment of a woman as merely
a means to pleasure in intercourse. To hold this solipsistic attitude towards women is to see 
women as mere automatons. As Langton claims, “To be an object on this picture, is to be a 
natural phenomenon: something which is not free, something whose movements could be 
explained and predicted by science, something whose movements are not determined by reason 
and choice.”lxxii This describes the automaton image common to solipsistic views in which all 
people function as automatons governed by physical laws and lacking consciousness. If this is 
addressed in terms of what has been determines so far by Langton then a merger between the 
inquiry on treatment and the solipsistic attitude begins to come into focus. The treatment of a 
person as an object (objectification) is dependent on holding a particular attitude or intention 
relative to the person being objectified. In having this psychological state, the objectifier begins 
to alter the moral nature of all of his actions by having good or ill intentions. The solution to the 
problem of sexual objectification for Langton is solved by merging context with psychological 
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states.
Nussbaum and Langton both make great strides towards developing a more complete 
theory of sexual objectification, however, the results they each reach seem to fail to fully account
for a number of factors. I agree with Langton, that Nussbaum's primary weakness is the lack of 
consideration towards attitudes and intentions as part of the moral nature of acts of 
objectification. This weakness of Nussbaum's is many ways complimented by Langton's own 
weakness. Despite developing an internalized theory of sexual objectification, Langton fails to 
properly engage with questions about whether mental states are merely sufficient, necessary, or 
jointly necessary and sufficient in the consideration of whether an act of objectification is 
morally permissible. Langton also doesn't consider in any length the possibility of internalization
and the idea that social and historic forces create the attitude towards women, apart from her 
consideration of porn and the sexualization of objects of representation. The divide between 
internal and external styles of approach also seems to be an error in thinking. The context of the 
relationship seems to interact on some level with the psychological state of each actor. This 
interplay seems just as important as the external and the internal factors themselves. 
The final chapter will more fully develop the ideas of internal factors in the process of 
objectification and how this interacts with the macro and micro level context of sexual acts. This 
theory will take the best points of Dworkin, MacKinnon, Nussbaum, and Langton and merge 
them into a solid Kantian framework to provide a meso theory of sexual objectification. This 
theory will provide enough nuance to Kant's strict deontology so as to allow for respectful casual
and loving intercourse that does not violate the right of free and rational agents to be ends in 
themselves. 
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Reinterpreting Objectification
Since Kant posed the problem of sexual objectification in his ethical treatises, many 
feminist writers have engaged in a discourse about the meaning and extent of this problem. 
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have come to understand sexual objectification as a 
perversion of the normal recognition of humanity in other people. Particularly, they have 
understood objectification as the central most problem of gender hierarchy. It is the process by 
which women lose their human quality and are reduced to objects for and of sex. This 
reductionist conception of women is the basis for all the violent acts against women perpetuated 
by gender hierarchy. They see the primary tool of this as pornography. A tool which creates an 
embodied practice, a tool which internalizes the superstructure of gender hierarchy within men 
and women alike; this analysis has leads to a strong feminist response to the Kantian problem. 
However, many have found the focus of Dworkin and MacKinnon's work to be too narrow and 
incapable of fully understanding the actual sexual lives of many people who seem capable of 
resisting the superstructure of gender hierarchy.
Martha Nussbaum's essay Objectification has become one of the most important pieces of
contemporary feminist writing. It is a philosophical rejection of Dworkin and MacKinnon's 
rather bleak analysis. Nussbaum insists that objectification can be a wonderful part of sexual life,
but that there are conditions which must be met. Her analysis rests on the position that at the 
level of actual human relationships there is a possibility of mutual surrender between sexual 
partners; a surrender which allows both sexual actors to give up their boundaries as subjects (this
is similarly reflected in Dworkin's Intercourse). This release of personal boundaries allows for 
the development of meaningful human relationships that are based upon a sort of transcendent32 
32 The word 'transcendent' here can indicate a sort of spiritual trust in the other person or something akin to 
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trust. For Nussbaum this trust is what makes particular sexual relationships, and perhaps love, a 
recognition of the true subject nature of another person. A recognition that goes beyond the basis 
of Kant's treatment of all people as ends, a treatment which allows one to share her humanity 
with another person and simultaneously be rewarded with the sharing of the lover's humanity in 
return. In this way Nussbaum rejects Kant's notion that our sexuality removes us from our 
humanity, arguing that it can be a force which allows us to recognize our human nature and the 
human nature of others at an entirely different level. 
However, despite her allowances for the subtlety and nuance of context in sexual 
relationships, Nussbaum does not account for the internal psychological states of attitudes and 
intentions. She defines the moral quality of an act of objectification solely on how the sexual 
actors stand in relation to one another. This fails to account for the intentions which shape the 
nature of our external actions. It ignores the role of the good will within Kant's moral theory. No 
act can be judged independent of the will of the actor. The beliefs one holds as one acts define 
the act.
This brief analysis of Nussbaum's perspective seems to show the need for a theory that 
can consider not only the influence of superstructure and personal context, but one which 
considers the will of the actors. This demand both tightens the argument for nuance and better 
frames the analysis of sexual objectification within the larger Kantian ethical framework. This 
need for internal consideration becomes the object of study for Rae Langton. Langton entertains 
the moral conundrum of sexual objectification in a thought experiment that approaches morality 
from the extreme of solipsism. This experiment examines the analysis of attitude and intention as
central features of objectification. It does so by starting from the extreme possibility that, 
Kant's conception of friendship. 
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perhaps, no one is actually deserving of moral respect. Langton considers the role of moral 
attitudes in a world in which all people besides the actor are automatons, but the actor has the 
epistemic limitation of not knowing the truth value of this claim. Langton believes that even if all
people were objects, there would still be a duty, based on epistemic limits, to treat them as 
subjects. The point of this experiment is to show that even in the most extreme of moral 
circumstances, there is still a duty to act in a way that affirms the humanity of other people. This 
position is taken as a point by which to consider the role of attitudes in morality from at a 
theoretical level, however, the transition from the theoretical to the practical is short and effective
for Langton. 
In terms of our treatment of others as sexual objects, the factor which defines our 
objectification is our attitude towards these people.  The notion underlying Langton's suggestion 
seems to be that the difference between the treatment of a person as a means and merely a means 
is psychological. This is because the treatment of the other as a person depends on recognition of
their humanity within my actions. Recognition in this sense results from, and perhaps is limited 
to, a psychological state held in relation to a target agent (the target agent in this case being the 
target of sexual activity). This seems to be the central problem of most theories of objectification 
within the feminist tradition. There is an equivocation of objectification and denial of 
subjecthood. In terms of the Kantian framework, however, objectification is morally acceptable 
so long as it does not lead to the denial of the subjecthood of the person being objectified (this 
would obviously hold true in cases of self-objectification as well). 
This important distinction that underlies Langton's work and her focus on psychological 
states indicate a progress to a near complete theory of sexual objectification. The problem lies in 
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her analysis lacking a conception of internalization and the relationship that develops between 
external and internal factors. There seems to be a dichotomy that has developed within these 
theories that has lost sight of the interplay between external and internal forces. The search for 
nuance in external and internal factors of sexual objectification has lost one of the most 
important contributions of Dworkin and MacKinnon, the contribution of internalization. 
The problem with pornography was not that it displayed abhorrent sexual acts, but that 
this display internalized the attitude of objectification among the masses, particularly men. This 
analysis is short sighted in its assumption of the automatic influence of internalization, however 
the suggestion that there is an interplay between the internal and external forces that play on our 
moral actions seems to be both correct and salient. The theory that this thesis offers will account 
for the influence of macro and micro level context, psychological states, and the interplay 
between these forces on the moral value of acts of sexual objectification. 
This theory begins with an important historical rejection of a carry-over from the 
enlightenment thought of Kant. Kant seems to believe, as many enlightenment thinkers did, that 
the body is somehow unimportant and unwanted in the analysis of truth and goodness. The body 
was considered an alien force asserting the will of the passions against the rational mind33. This 
rejection of the body from conceptions of the self seems like the first grave misstep in analyzing 
sexual objectification. If one begins an analysis of humanity by rejecting the body and the self as 
interconnected with that body then one misses out on part of what it means to be fully human. 
The full recognition of a meaningful human life depends on having a relationship with one's 
body rather than a denial of the body's importance. The body is socially constructed and exists 
within socially defined space (i.e. gender, race, sex, etc.). This social construction becomes 
33 This is apparent in Kant's discussion of sexual desire in the Lectures on Ethics.  
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internalized into a sense of self. The self is then socially constructed and embodied. If one does 
not account for this embodiment of the self and instead rejects the physical portion of the self 
then one fails to truly account for the human condition. When Kant rejects the sexual self then he
is rejecting part of what it means to be a human subject and partially what it means to be an end 
in oneself. If it is true that the body and our relationship to the body play an important role in 
ethical thought, as I think they do, then this must be accounted for in an analysis of sexual 
objectification. 
To illustrate the importance of the body, recognition, respect, and reciprocation I will 
analyze the following three cases.
1. The case of Eric and Donna from That 70's Show.
2. The case of Hartigan and Nancy from Sin City.34
3. The case of Holden and Alyssa in Chasing Amy.35 
Each of these cases will highlight a different type of relationship and circumstance within
which objectification occurs. These examples will be referred to throughout the rest of this 
chapter and used to examine different parts of this theory of sexual objectification. 
In the first case, Eric and Donna have known each other all of their lives, but have never 
dated. They flirt casually about sex with Donna telling Eric, “You could have had me when I was
four.” Donna's seemingly innocuous comment reveals a sort of ongoing sexual tension between 
herself and Eric, a sexual tension that is held in check by a lifetime of meaningful friendship. 
This is the first indication that Eric and Donna have a friendship that is marked by mutual 
respect. Eric finds Donna romantically attractive, but holds back his feelings to avoid risking the 
34 Text for the quotes from Sin City are taken from “Sin City Quotes,” Internet Movie Data Base, accessed August 
6, 2014. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0401792/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu.
35 Text for the quotes from Chasing Amy are taken from “Chasing Amy Quotes,” Internet Movie Data Base, 
accessed August 6, 2014. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118842/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu.
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destruction of their meaningful relationship. Similarly, Donna tells Eric that she wants him 
sexually while not forcing or using him to satisfy these desires.lxxiii This initial interaction in the 
first episode of the series shows the context and intentions of both Eric and Donna. They have a 
mutual sexual attraction that results in objectifying desires and intentions, the use of the other as 
a sexual means to an end, but they initially restrain their sexual desires because of their concern 
about one another as ends in themselves. 
Despite the amiable relationship between Eric and Donna, there is always a background 
of gender hierarchy in the show. In the episode “Battle of the Sexists,” Eric and Donna have an 
argument about Donna's ability to beat Eric at basketball and other games. The argument 
escalates between the two as various other characters comically reinforce gender roles. The most 
obvious reinforcement comes from Kelso and Jackie when Kelso argues that his ability to use 
Jackie as a sexual object makes him more manly than engaging her about boundaries.lxxiv This 
shows a subversive instantiation of gender hierarchy wherein masculinity is secured by taking 
women as objects and not engaging them as fully human. This sort of treatment is contrasted by 
Eric and Donna who resist prescribed gender roles and address their issues as equal persons. The 
result is that Eric and Donna have the ability to function at a personal and nuanced level that is 
resistant to the larger social order. This is further reinforced throughout the series at large as 
Donna continuously rejects traditional femininity. 
As the show continues, the context of gender hierarchy is reinforced and feminist 
concerns are often turned into a joke (i.e. Midge's feminist night classes).lxxv The presence of this 
context shows how the sitcom is representative of contemporary American culture. However, 
despite being situated within contemporary American culture, That 70's Show offers an example 
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of resistance against near ubiquitous gender hierarchy. When Eric and Donna finally decide to 
have sex it is juxtaposed against the marriage of Donna's parents. In “The First Time,” Midge 
and Bob ask Donna to write their wedding vows for their second marriage. Donna struggles with 
the task because she fails to see any love existing between her parents. She finally writes the 
vows as a representation of the love her and Eric share for each other. The reading of these vows 
spawns a moment of intense intimacy between Eric and Donna, and results in their first act of 
sex.lxxvi 
Eric and Donna's first act of sex is an act of intimacy and not an act of sexual use. Neither
participant is using the other merely as a means to an end. They seek pleasure from each other, 
but they do not discard one another after their desires are sated. This is an immediate rejection of 
Kant's theory that any act of extramarital sex results in the use of a person as merely a means and
not as an end in herself. It also happens within the context of gender hierarchy, but with an 
awareness of the injustice of that arrangement. Eric and Donna see gender hierarchy modeled in 
their parents and friends, but they do not imitate it. Instead, they reject gender hierarchy and the 
framing of Donna's identity as an object of sexual conquest (gender female). This means two 
important things: Eric and Donna can resist the macro context of their interactions, and That 70's
Show represents that sort of resistance despite being produced within a gender hierarchical 
society. This means that Eric and Donna's relationship models an important interplay between 
recognition, respect, and reciprocation.
Eric and Donna recognize their humanity in one another as part of their on-going 
relationship. They have been friends since they were young children, and from this friendship 
they began to date as an expression of their budding romantic love for one another. This love 
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becomes the context of their personal relationship and defines their individual interactions. 
Beyond the personal, Eric and Donna recognize their position relative to the social order of 
things. Eric refuses to see Donna as traditionally gender feminine by embracing her strength and 
independence rather than presuming her submission. The two craft their relationship in constant 
resistance to prescribed gender roles and with the intention of recognizing each other as the 
individuals that they are. There are times when this is a struggle, but overall the recognition of 
each other’s personhood is contextual at both the micro and macro level. 
The recognition of the mutual personhood of Eric and Donna is supplemented by mutual 
respectful treatment. Eric and Donna respect each other by treating one another as fully human- 
i.e. recognizing, understanding, and promoting each other’s desires, dreams, and identity. In 
addition to respectful behaviors, like not purposefully losing games, breaking up for a lack of 
immediate sexual satisfaction, and being committed to each other’s emotional welfare, Eric and 
Donna also share respectful attitudes. The show gives ready access to Eric and Donna's thoughts 
and these thoughts are almost always populated with concerns about the other person and a 
desire to understand their perspective. These behaviors and attitudes are a paradigm example of 
respect.
Reciprocation permeates the other two criteria, but is especially apparent in Eric and 
Donna's desire to not have sex until they are both ready and to have sex that they both enjoy. 
Eric's restraint of his sexual desires until Donna initiates the sex shows that he is not acting 
unilaterally to fulfill his sexual desires. This is then further supported when in “Afterglow” after 
the two have sex, Eric and Donna openly discuss their desire to have sex that they both enjoy 
when they are both comfortable with the idea.lxxvii 
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Eric and Donna's fulfillment of these three criteria show that sexual intercourse does not 
necessarily lead to the treatment of a person as a mere means to an end. Eric and Donna treat 
each other as fully human before, during, and after sex. This seems to support the idea that one 
can resist the macro level context of gender hierarchy by actively resisting its objectification of 
women. It also shows that individuals can resist by crafting a personal relationship built on 
shared behavioral and attitudinal treatments of one another. 
Among the myriad of stories that compose Frank Miller's 2005 film Sin City, the story of 
detective Hartigan and Nancy Callahan is the most interesting for a study of sexual 
objectification. Where That 70's Show rejects Kant's claim that sex cannot be an act that 
recognizes the humanity of another person, Sin City shows that the drive for sexual desire can be 
resisted when one recognizes the humanity in another person. Between these two cases it 
becomes clear that sexual desire is not as powerful as Kant claimed, and that people could keep 
their faculties even when sexually objectifying another person. 
Hartigan is a detective in Basin City, the fictional setting of Sin City. It is a town filled 
with corruption, crime, prostitution, and violence. The story opens with Hartigan contemplating 
his coming retirement and his final case of a menacing pedophile. He is a presented as a rough 
around the edges do-gooder who has a family waiting for him. Hartigan abandons his partner and
back-up to confront the pedophile, Roark Jr., and save the eleven year old Nancy Callahan. 
Immediately after disarming Roark Jr. by taking his gun and his genitals, Hartigan is betrayed 
and imprisoned for the crime of raping Callahan. He is imprisoned for eight years where his only
contact with the outside world is through the letters written to him by Callahan as she grows up. 
Eventually the letters stop and Hartigan is confronted by a foul smelling stranger who knocks 
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him out. Upon awaking, Hartigan discovers the severed finger of a 19-year-old girl who he can 
only assume is Callahan. In an effort to save her one last time, Hartigan confesses to the rape and
is released for time served. He seeks out Callahan who greets him with an intimate kiss. Upon 
being reunited, Hartigan thinks to himself how much Callahan has grown and how she has 
become a woman. Amidst their reunion, Hartigan and Callahan are pursued by several gangsters 
and forced to hide out in a motel. Once there, Callahan tries to seduce Hartigan by telling him 
how she has only ever loved him. Hartigan walks away for a cold shower to ease the tension, 
only to be knocked unconscious and left to die. The story concludes with him hunting down 
Callahan and Roark Jr., the foul smelling man. Hartigan kills Roark Jr. out of rage and states his 
love for Callahan one last time. He then kills himself to keep the gangsters from targeting him 
through Callahan.lxxviii 
Hartigan and Callahan's story is interesting because Hartigan's treatment of Callahan is 
juxtaposed with Roark Jr.'s treatment. Hartigan first recognizes Callahan as a child that needs to 
be protected from Roark Jr.'s sexual objectification, while Roark Jr. sees the eleven year old 
Callahan as an appropriate sexual object for his conquest, as he tortures and rapes his victims. 
Then after eight years, Hartigan sees Callahan as a sexual object when he runs into her as a 19-
year-old stripper, but because Hartigan still sees her as the child he saved he still views her as 
fully human. It is this recognition of her personhood that drives Hartigan to resist her sexual 
advances despite his sexual objectification of her as a grown and filled out woman.lxxix Roark Jr. 
rejects her personhood and even resents her for no longer being a child. In this comparison it is 
clear that Hartigan can see Callahan as a person while still identifying her as a sexual object, but 
also that Roark Jr. can only see her as an object of sexual desire. 
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Hartigan's respect for Callahan is shown is his constant admission of loving her and 
rejecting her sexual advances. He never seeks to use Callahan as a means to his own sexual 
desire, but instead seeks to treat her as a person with her own life to live. He tries to give her the 
tools to live her life by killing off her tormentor and by killing himself to set her free. Roark Jr. 
treats Callahan with nothing but disrespect. He kidnaps and tortures her twice, and uses her 
merely as a means of sexual pleasure when she is a child and merely as a way to get to Hartigan 
as an adult. Callahan is never treated as a person, but instead as merely an object to be used for 
Roark Jr.'s changing needs. 
Reciprocation between Hartigan and Callahan comes in the form of their shared love for 
one another. They both seem to have a deep affection revealed by their actions and thoughts, but 
this love is one that moves Hartigan to reject Callahan's sexual advances as much as it moves 
Callahan to make them. Roark Jr. cannot enter into any form of reciprocation with Callahan 
because he cannot see her as an autonomous subject. 
Sin City offers an interesting comparison between resistance to and complacency with 
gender hierarchy. Hartigan constantly strives to recognize Callahan's humanity, while Roark Jr. 
constantly works to undermine it. It shows the possibility for love to be a force that overwhelms 
sexual urges and helps people to become conscious of the humanity of others. It also shows that 
people are fundamentally complex and that they cannot be defined as being merely lustful or 
merely loving. People have a variety of attitudes towards others at any given time, but the 
question is whether these attitudes allow them to recognize the humanity of another person or to 
recognize that other person as merely a means to their own personal desire. 
While That 70's Show exemplifies the moral value of intimate extramarital sex and Sin 
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City shows the ability of a man to sexually objectify a woman while still respecting her as a 
friend and person, Chasing Amy is about the process of consciousness raising. Chasing Amy 
explores the relationship that develops between Holden McNeil and Alyssa Jones. McNeil is an 
average guy who is seen in the beginning of the film just looking for love, while Jones is 
presented as his love interest and an open Lesbian. When McNeil discovers that Jones is a 
lesbian he is initially irritated, but Jones pushes him to develop a friendship with her. As the 
friendship between the two grows, McNeil decides that he is no longer satisfied with being only 
friends. When Jones is confronted by McNeil she initially resists, but eventually gives in to 
McNeil's romantic advances. Once the couple get together McNeil finds out about Jones' sexual 
history. He finds out that she has been with multiple men and women, and decides to confront 
her about his discomfort. The two have a large argument that ends with both of the characters 
walking away. After receiving some advice from Silent Bob, McNeil tries to resolve his 
relationship issues with Jones, but finds that even at his best he is not treating her appropriately. 
The film concludes with McNeil coming to a sort of realization about the nature of his actions. 
The macro level social context that sets Chasing Amy is the contemporary gender 
hierarchy of the United States. The movie has archetypical aggressive and sexually competitive 
men (Holden McNeil and Banky Edwards), women who are treated as sexual objects (Alyssa 
Jones, the lesbians at the Meow Mix bar, and Amy), and the effeminate and threatening 
homosexual men (Hooper X and to an extent Banky Edwards). These characters represent a set 
of typical gender relations within the social context, but the film challenges each of these 
relations with the development of the love story between McNeil and Jones. 
In many ways Chasing Amy is about McNeil's growth as a character via his relationship 
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with Jones. When McNeil and Jones first hang out they see a couple making out on top of 
Edwards' car. Upon seeing the couple McNeil asserts, “You gotta respect that kind of display of 
affection, you know what I mean? Sure, it's crazy, it's rude, it's self-absorbed, but, uh, you know, 
it's love.” To which Jones quickly disagrees.lxxx McNeil's notion of love as being necessarily 
selfish, rude, and crazy reflects his belief that love is exemplified by passionate sex. Jones 
expands on her disagreement later in the park when she differentiates “fucking” as being sex 
without love.lxxxi The open discussion about sex that ensues between McNeil and Jones both 
challenges McNeil's definitions of love and sex and his relationship with Jones. He goes from 
seeing love as a sort of infatuation with Jones to a sort of experience with her. He starts to shed 
some of his biases and opens himself up to new ideas, like that lesbians can have legitimate sex 
without a man involved. The evolution of his thoughts and his growing respect for Jones show 
her impact upon him as a catalyst of consciousness raising. She challenges McNeil's world view 
and in doing so helps him to see her as a full person. 
Despite McNeil's progress, his consciousness raising is thwarted by his discovery of 
Jones' past sexual experiences with men. McNeil reverts to his former ideology of competitive 
masculinity and becomes threatened by the devaluation of his perceived conquest of Jones.  
McNeil channels his rage to confront Jones, reject her claims of love, and isolates himself from 
her. McNeil's rejection is not a testament to the inability of men to resist gender hierarchy, but 
the difficulty of resistance. Before McNeil abandons his progress in consciousness raising 
completely, he is offered advice from Silent Bob's story about “chasing Amy.” Silent Bob tells 
him that he once fell in love with a girl named Amy, but that he broke up with her over her past 
sexual experiences. Silent Bob then concludes his story by saying:
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It was a mistake. I didn't hate her. I wasn't disgusted with her. I was afraid. At that 
moment, I felt small, like... like I'd lacked experience, like I'd never be on her 
level, like I'd never be enough for her or something like that, you know what I'm 
saying? But, what I did not get, she didn't care. She wasn't looking for that guy 
anymore. She was... she was looking for me, for the Bob. But, uh, by the time I 
figure this all out, it was too late, man. She moved on, and all I had to show for it 
was some foolish pride, which then gave way to regret. She was the girl, I know 
that now. But I pushed her away. So, I've spent every day since then chasing 
Amy... so to speak.lxxxii 
Silent Bob's story shows how the internalization of gender hierarchy can blind people to the 
personhood of others- i.e. McNeil's view of Jones and Silent Bob's view of Amy. The story about
chasing Amy was also important for putting McNeil back on a path of consciousness raising. 
McNeil shifts away from his ideas of owning and conquering Jones to his ideas of building a 
relationship with her. In a final effort to get things to work between them he suggests that she 
agree to have a threesome with himself and Edwards. McNeil tells Jones that it would resolve the
issues between him, Edwards, and herself. He tries to argue for his desire to move past her sexual
experiences and to accept her as a full person. After Jones expresses her skepticism over 
McNeil's plan she tells him how much she loves him and says, “I love you, I always will. Know 
that. But I'm not your fucking whore.”lxxxiii Jones offers a final development in McNeil's 
consciousness raising by explaining to him that he cannot use sexual conquest or experience to 
develop respect for another person. This final realization leads into the film's conclusion where a 
year after this conversation McNeil reunites with Edwards and Jones. The reunion is marked not 
by sex or aggression, but by McNeil's recognition of both Edwards and Jones as full persons with
their own lives and desires. The shift in McNeil's attitude from the beginning of the film to the 
end shows his growing resistance to gender hierarchy and his ability to see the humanity in 
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others beyond merely sex. 
Chasing Amy shows the process of consciousness raising and how it relates to the model 
of recognition, respect, and reciprocation. McNeil's recognition of Jones' personhood occurs 
slowly throughout the film as a result of a constant questioning of his values by himself and by 
others- i.e. Jones, Edwards, and Silent Bob. This questioning leads to McNeil's epiphany that 
Jones is not only the object of his desire, but a person that has her own inclinations. This shifts 
McNeil's desire from having Jones to having an experience or relationship with Jones. The 
recognition of the humanity of another person requires an awareness of the inclinations, 
attitudes, and thoughts of that person. 
Once McNeil recognizes Jones' personhood, he struggles to find ways to appropriately 
respect her as fully human. His attempt to share an experience with her through a threesome still 
left her as a mere object for him to use, but his ability to walk away and come back to her as a 
friend showed his ability to respect her choices for her life. This respect for Jones was hard to 
develop and required a change of McNeil's attitudes towards her and women in general. 
For McNeil, reciprocation came in the form of his acceptance of Jones leaving. McNeil 
had to stop chasing after Jones so that he could finally reciprocate her love. He realized that his 
pursuit of her was its own act of objectification. The only way they could respect each other and 
themselves was for Jones to leave and for McNeil to stop chasing her. 
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Conclusion
Sexual objectification is many times more complex than Kant imagined when he wrote it 
away as a side thought in his treatises and lectures. It is not something that is always wrong, but 
instead an action that is filled with nuance that defines it morality. The best way to see if 
someone is treated immorally (merely as a means) or morally (both as a means to an end and as 
an end in herself) while being sexually objectified is to look for recognition, respect, and 
reciprocation. Recognition of another person's humanity requires an awareness of his or her 
personhood in spite of gender hierarchy or internalized oppressive beliefs. If one cannot 
recognize the humanity in another person then one cannot treat them as they ought to be treated. 
Respect requires a controlled behavioral and attitudinal response to someone who is identified as 
a person. It fails to occur when either behavior or attitudes treat that person in a way that denies 
their humanity, i.e. denies their own attitudes, desires, and thoughts. Reciprocation is met when 
people are treated by some person as they are treating them. This does not mean an eye for an 
eye, but to treat someone treating you as a lover, a stranger, or a friend with the appropriate 
amount of returned respect. If reciprocation is not present then the relationship becomes unjust 
because all parties are not being equally recognized and respected in their humanity. 
This theory of recognition, respect, and reciprocation is designed to provide a nuanced 
perspective for judging interactions between different agents as just or unjust within various 
social frameworks. It is particularly apt for the Kantian sex problem, but should be able to be 
applied to questions of race, class, or any other suspected case of othering. This thesis is not able 
to fully address the range of issues this theory can approach, nor is it capable of grounding itself 
effectively in a broader literature. The limits of this research have left many of the examples and 
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theoretical discussions bound in heternormativity, but there is a great deal to be said about how 
the construction of different bodies in different genders and sexes can lead to different forms of 
sexual objectification. I am confident that the theory that I have offered in this thesis can be 
applied to these problems, but I do not have the resources to fully address this idea in my current 
research. 
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